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ABSTRACT. America has become a nation of homebodies. Rates of interstate mobility, by
most estimates, have been falling for decades. Interstate mobility rates are particularly low and
stagnant among disadvantaged groups -despite a growing connection between mobility and
economic opportunity. Perhaps most importantly, mobility is declining in regions where it is
needed most. Americans are not leaving places hit by economic crises, resulting in unemploy-
ment rates and low wages that linger in these areas for decades. And people are not moving to
rich regions where the highest wages are available.
This Article advances two central claims. First, declining interstate mobility rates create
problems for federal macroeconomic policymaking. Low rates of interstate mobility make it
harder for the Federal Reserve to meet both sides of its "dual mandate": ensuring both stable
prices and maximum employment. Low interstate mobility rates also impair the efficacy and
affordability of federal safety net programs that rely on state and local participation, and reduce
wealth and growth by inhibiting agglomeration economies. While determining an optimal rate
of interstate mobility is difficult, policies that unnaturally inhibit interstate moves worsen na-
tional economic problems.
Second, the Article argues that governments, mostly at the state and local levels, have creat-
ed a huge number of legal barriers to interstate mobility. Land-use laws and occupational licens-
ing regimes limit entry into local and state labor markets. Different eligibility standards for pub-
lic benefits, public employee pension policies, homeownership subsidies, state and local tax
regimes, and even basic property law rules inhibit exit from low-opportunity states and cities.
Furthermore, building codes, mobile home bans, federal location-based subsidies, legal con-
straints on knocking down houses, and the problematic structure of Chapter 9 municipal bank-
ruptcy all limit the capacity of failing cities to "shrink" gracefully, directly reducing exit among
some populations and increasing the economic and social costs of entry limits elsewhere.
Combining these two insights, the Article shows that big questions of macroeconomic policy
and performance turn on the content of state and local policies usually analyzed using microeco-
nomic tools. Many of the legal barriers to interstate mobility emerged or became stricter during
the period in which interstate mobility declined. While causation is difficult to determine, public
policies developed by state and local governments more interested in guaranteeing local popula-
tion stability than ensuring successful macroeconomic conditions either generated or failed to
stymie falling mobility rates. The Article concludes by suggesting how the federal government
could address tagnation in interstate mobility.
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STUCK! THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF RESIDENTIAL STAGNATION
INTRODUCTION: AMERICA'S STICKY INTERNAL LABOR MARKET
Leaving one's home in search of a better life is, perhaps, the most classic of
all American stories. We fled England in pursuit of freedom from religious per-
secution by the British. We moved north in the Great Migration.' "Go West,
young man," we were told, "and grow with the country."2 Federal programs al-
low us to "move to opportunity."'
But today, the number of Americans who leave home for new opportunities
is in decline. A series of studies shows that the interstate' migration rate has
fallen substantially since the 198os.' Americans now move less often than Ca-
nadians, and no more than Finns or Danes.6 Even the most prominent study
finding no general decline in mobility does observe that mobility rates are low-
1. For an excellent history of the Great Migration, see ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF
OTHER SUNS: THE EPic STORY OF AMERICA's GREAT MIGRATION (2010).
2. See Go West, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Go-West
-1o86091 [http://perma.cc/382X-GTR5]. Usually attributed to Horace Greeley, this term
was likely coined by John Soule. See Milton Hirsch, "The Voice of Adjuration": The Sixth
Amendment Right to Compulsory Process Fifty Years After United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen,
3o FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 81, 83 n.6 (2002). Greeley did use a similar phrase to urge westward
expansion. See id.
3. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
4. The Article uses the terms "interstate" and "interregional" roughly interchangeably, as mov-
ing from one metropolitan area to another often involves moving across state lines, and
some policies directly implicate state-to-state moves. That said, the economically relevant
question is whether people move between metropolitan areas. A person who moves from
Buffalo to New York City will enter a different labor market, while a person who moves
from Arlington, Virginia to Bethesda, Maryland will not. Where this difference is relevant,
the Article will note and discuss it.
5. See, e.g., Greg Kaplan & Sam Schulhofer-Wohl, Understanding the Long-Run Decline in Inter-
state Migration, 58 INT'L ECON. REv. 57 (2017); Raven Molloy et al., Internal Migration in the
United States, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2011, at 173, 174; Raven Molloy et al., Declining Mi-
gration Within the U.S.: The Role of the Labor Market (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 20,o65, 2014) [hereinafter Molloy et al., Declining Migration]; William H.
Frey, The Great American Migration Slowdown: Regional and Metropolitan Dimensions, BROOK-
INGS INSTITUTION (Dec. 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2o16/o6
/1209_migration frey.pdf [http://perma.cc/QPF2-4VAR].
6. Eli Lehrer & Lori Sanders, Moving to Work, NAT'L AFF., Winter 2014, at 21, 22 (" [R]esidents
of Canada ... are now more likely to have moved recently than their American counter-
parts.'"); Timothy Noah, Stay Put, Young Man, WASH. MONTHLY (Nov./Dec. 2013), http://
washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/novdec-2013/stay-put-young-man [http://perma.cc
/V9Z3- 5TMF] ("America ... is no more mobile than ... Denmark or Finland.").
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er among disadvantaged groups and that mobility has not increased despite be-
coming "more important" to individual economic advancement.'
More troubling still, Americans are no longer moving from poor regions to
rich ones. This observation captures two trends in declining mobility. First,
fewer Americans are moving away from geographic areas of low economic op-
portunity. David Autor, David Dorn, and their colleagues have studied declin-
ing regions that lost manufacturing jobs due to shocks created by Chinese im-
port competition. Traditionally, such shocks would be expected to generate
temporary spikes in unemployment rates, which would then subside as unem-
ployed people left the area to find new jobs. But these studies found that un-
employment rates and average wage reductions persisted over time.' Ameri-
cans, especially those who are non-college educated,9 are choosing to stay in
areas hit by negative economic shocks. There is a long history of localized
shocks generating interstate mobility in the United States; today, however,
economists at the International Monetary Fund note that "following the same
negative shock to labor demand, affected workers have more and more tended
7. Scott Winship, When Moving Matters: Residential and Economic Mobility Trends in America,
188o-2olo, MANHATTAN INST. 38-39 (Nov. io, 2015), http://www.manhattan-institute.org
/html/when-moving-matters-residential-and-economic-mobility-trends-america-188o
-2010-8048.html [http://perma.cc/PP7R-Q63C] (finding no general decline in mobility but
finding that mobility rates are lower among those with less than collegiate educational at-
tainment and that mobility is increasingly important for economic outcomes). The differ-
ence between these two findings is small when measured against a normative baseline of the
right or efficient amount of mobility rather than against historical trends. That is, all major
studies of mobility find either that the mobility rate is falling or that the mobility rate should
be rising and is not.
8. See Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, David Dom, Gordon H. Hanson & Brendan
Price, Import Competition and the Great U.S. Employment Sag of the 2000s, 34 J. LAB. ECON.
S141, S183 (2016) (describing how Chinese trade drove job losses in some regions but did
not affect population change); David H. Autor, David Dom & Gordon H. Hanson, The Chi-
na Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States, 103 AM.
ECON. REV. 2121, 2141-42 (2013) (finding "no robust evidence ... that shocks to local manu-
facturing lead to substantial changes in population"); David H. Autor, David Dom, Gordon
H. Hanson & Jae Song, Trade Adjustment: Worker-Level Evidence, 2014 Q.J. ECON. 1799, 1830
(noting that workers in import-competing industries face substantial wage and employment
losses that persist over time, but "geographic mobility is not a primary mechanism for ad-
justing to trade shocks").
9. See John Bound & Harry J. Holzer, Demand Shifs, Population Adjustments, and Labor Market
Outcomes During the 198os, 18 J. LAB. ECON. 20, 23 (2000) ("[L]ess-educated workers had
relatively low rates of population adjustment in response to these demand changes."); Mat-
thew J. Notowidigdo, The Incidence of Local Labor Demand Shocks (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 17,167, 2011) (same).
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to either drop out of the labor force or remain unemployed instead of relocat-
ing."1o
Second, lower-skilled workers are not moving to high-wage cities and re-
gions. Bankers and technologists continue to move from Mississippi or Arkan-
sas to New York or Silicon Valley, but few janitors make similar moves, despite
the higher nominal wages on offer in rich regions for all types of jobs. As a re-
sult, local economic booms no longer create boomtowns. Economically success-
ful regions like Silicon Valley, San Francisco, New York, and Boston have seen
only slow population growth over the last twenty-five years." Inequality be-
tween states has become entrenched. Peter Ganong and Daniel Shoag have
shown that a hundred-year trend of "convergence" between the richest and
poorest states in per-capita state Gross Domestic Product (GDP) slowed in the
1980 s and now has effectively come to a halt.12
This Article will make two claims. First, it will argue that the stickiness of
America's internal labor market is a fundamental macroeconomic problem that
influences the quality of monetary policy, overall economic output and growth,
and the efficacy of federal safety net spending. While there is no way to deter-
mine an optimal rate of interstate migration, important federal policies-like
the use of a single currency and cooperative federalist social welfare pro-
grams - rely on a substantial amount of interstate labor mobility to function.
Further, empirical estimates show that increasing interstate migration rates,
and particularly moves to rich regions, would substantially increase economic
activity and welfare. 14
10. Mai Dao et al., Regional Labor Market Adjustments in the United States and Europe 4 (Int'l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 14/26, 2014).
n1. See RYAN AvENT, THE GATED CITY 10C. 7, 799-914 (2011) (ebook) (noting that Silicon Valley
lost population between 1995 and 2000 and saw only slow growth between 2000 and 2010);
David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1675 (2013) (describing slow popula-
tion growth in rich cities and regions).
12. See Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S.
Declined? 2 (Jan. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://scholar.harvard.edu/shoag
/publications/why-has-regional-income-convergence-usdeclined [http://perma.cc/TEK8
-GMEJ].
13. One possibility this raises is that, if mobility rates remain low, perhaps these national poli-
cies should be abandoned. If mobility rates continue to fall, the use of the dollar as a single
currency for the whole United States will become increasingly problematic. Similarly, if mo-
bility rates continue to fall, there will be pressure on the federal government to take greater
control over programs like Medicaid, as poorer states will not be able to fund them ade-
quately. That said, these would be radical steps. This Article treats the existence of, say, a
single currency for the United States, as a given to be planned around rather than an area for
possible reform.
14. See infra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
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Second, the Article will show that state and local (and a few federal) laws
and policies have created substantial barriers to interstate mobility, particularly
for lower-income Americans. Land-use laws and occupational licensing re-
gimes limit entry into local and state labor markets. Differing eligibility stand-
ards for public benefits, public employee pensions, homeownership tax subsi-
dies, state and local tax laws, and even basic property law doctrines inhibit exit
from low-opportunity states and cities. Building codes, mobile home bans, lo-
cation-based subsidies, legal constraints on knocking down houses, and the
problematic structure of Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy all limit the capacity
of failing cities to shrink gracefully, directly reducing exit among some popula-
tions and increasing the economic and social costs of entry limits elsewhere.
The effect on mobility of a few of these policies, like land-use restrictions, is al-
ready understood in the literature. But this Article is the first to recognize the
pervasiveness and variety of state and local policies that limit mobility.
A number of these policies changed substantially in ways that made popu-
lations stickier during the period when mobility fell. It is not clear whether
these legal changes caused declines in mobility, or simply failed to push back
against "natural" changes that reduced mobility -such as an aging population,
declining churn in employment, and decreasing diversity of employers by re-
gion due to the increasing economic dominance of the service sector. " But state
and local policies in part dictate where people move, particularly by keeping
people out of the richest metropolitan areas and best job markets. 16 Whether as
15. Empirical work by Raven Molloy et al. finds that declining interstate mobility is most likely
a product of broad changes in the labor market. See Molloy et al., Declining Migra-
tion, supra note 5, at 6. Greg Kaplan and Sam Schulhofer-Wohl find a decline in people mov-
ing across states and then moving back, driven by the declining costs of learning about other
places due to the internet. See Kaplan & Schulhofer-Wohl, supra note 5. They also find a de-
creasing local specificity in jobs, with regional job markets looking more like one anoth-
er. Id. An aging population may move less as well. See Fatih Karahan & Darius Li, What
Caused the Decline in Interstate Migration in the United States?, LIBERTY ST. ECON. (Oct. 17,
2016), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2o16/lo/what-caused-the-decline-in
-interstate-migration-in-the-united-states.html [http://perma.cc/M4ZX-MYB6].
All of that said, one should not overstate the distinction between "natural" explanations
for declining mobility and policy ones, as they interact in all sorts of ways. The increased
similarity of metropolitan economies is likely both a cause of reduced mobility (why move?)
and a product of reduced mobility (if workers cannot move due to regulations or other legal
barriers, then firms need to spread out production facilities). Aging reduces mobility, but the
size of the effect is larger due to preferences among the aging for strict land-use controls and
homeownership subsidies. See infra Sections II.A.1, II.B.i and II.B.3. And so forth. Laws that
limit mobility help generate the "natural" forces that are then credited for reducing mobility.
16. See infra Part II.
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a direct cause or as mere bystanders, state, local, and federal laws therefore bear
some responsibility for declining interstate mobility.
Abstracting from these two claims, a key takeaway of this Article is that the
success of macroeconomic policy turns in large part on state and local govern-
ment interventions traditionally analyzed using microeconomic tools." In aggre-
gate, these local and state policies play a substantial role in creating or failing to
combat the central macroeconomic problems of our time: slow growth rates,
increasing inequality of wealth and income, and the difficulties of balancing in-
flation and unemployment.
However, state and local policies must answer to state and local needs,
which are often in tension with broader national interests. In particular, popu-
lation stability-the very opposite of mobility-can be beneficial to existing
residents of a local or state government. Areas with stable populations are less
risky and more attractive to investors." Families, too, may prefer population-
stable areas, where grandchildren are more likely to live near their grandpar-
ents. State and local governments that want to promote investment and the in-
terests of local families and homeowners may thus place a premium on stabil-
ity. In fact, as I (and others) have argued elsewhere, the structure and process
of state and local government decisionmaking often overrepresents the voices
of those local residents who care the most about stability and the least about
growth. "
State and local governments have few incentives to consider broader na-
tional economic implications when writing zoning codes or establishing public
pension rules. My previous work has shown how the very existence of local
governments encourages people to move away from economically superior lo-
cations in order to receive a preferred package of government services.2 0 Where
local or state governments have the power to limit entry or reduce exit, the
17. This Article is part of an effort started by my colleague Yair Listokin to integrate macroeco-
nomics and legal studies. See Yair Listokin, A Theoretical Framework for Law and Macroeco-
nomics (Yale Law Sch., Public Law Research Paper No. 586, 2016), http://ssm.com
/abstract=2860283 [http://perma.cc/VV27-5EK].
18. See infra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
ig. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 11, at 1704-17 (arguing that land-use procedure privileges the
interests of homeowners even in big cities where they are outnumbered); see also Aaron
Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust
Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 1093, 1095-97 (2014) (discussing how occupational licensing
boards staffed by industry representatives often protect incumbents and keep out newcom-
ers).
20. See David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 1507, 1511-
12 (arguing that sorting by individuals for local governmental services reduces agglomera-
tion gains).
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harm to agglomerative efficiency, and thus national economic output, is sub-
stantially increased. Surprisingly, even many federal policies also fail to take na-
tional macroeconomic issues into account.2 1 Most of the federal policies dis-
cussed in this Article-from Medicaid waivers to Chapter 9 bankruptcy for
municipalities- are developed in silos without much input from institutions
like the Federal Reserve or from other officials concerned with broader ques-
tions of unemployment and inflation.
Recognizing these tensions, this Article seeks to chart a course that will
help law and policymakers at every level better promote federal macroeconomic
policy. As this Article will establish, the entity best situated to protect federal
interests is the federal government. Ideally, the federal government should de-
velop tools that force decisionmakers at all levels of government to consider the
macroeconomic implications of their interventions. As a second-best solution,
the federal government could counteract laws that reduce mobility by creating
direct financial incentives for individuals to move. Of course, neither strategy
will solve all the problems of residential stagnation overnight- some people
simply will not want or be able to move. But the strategies recommended in
this Article are an important first step in reorienting federal, state, and local law
to better reflect national economic needs.
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses why mobility is
important on a national macroeconomic level. Part II discusses how law ob-
structs entry, exit, and the graceful decline of dying cities. The Article con-
cludes by sketching a legal and policy agenda to increase interstate mobility in
America.
I. WHY IS INTERSTATE MOBILITY IMPORTANT? LABOR MOBILITY
AND LAW IN ECONOMIC THEORY
As a preliminary matter, this Article does not purport to span the entire
field of mobility studies. A rich literature addresses issues of international labor
mobility, particularly the immigration law regime.22 Scholars have also exten-
21. Perhaps it is not surprising that these macroeconomic concerns are not taken into account in
the making of law and policy by parts of the federal government. Yair Listokin has argued
that, outside of the Federal Reserve and debates over federal stimulus spending, macroeco-
nomic concerns are not taken into account by federal policymakers as a general matter (alt-
hough they should be). See Listokin, supra note 17, at 2.
22. The literature on the legal and economic aspects of international migration is far too massive
and quickly growing to address here. One thing worth noting is that international migrants
may help reduce some of the costs imposed by limits on interstate migration but not others.
If there are jobs available in rich areas but internal migration restrictions prevent people in
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sively discussed intrastate residential mobility, especially how residents and
workers in a single labor market choose between competing local governments
when deciding where to live.23 International and intrastate mobility are im-
portant fields, but to focus exclusively on these two areas is to ignore a crucial
aspect of American migration patterns.
This Article instead seeks to push the discussion of interstate mobility to
the forefront.24 As this Part will demonstrate, interstate migration has im-
portant macroeconomic implications that deserve serious scholarly attention.
The following Sections discuss the relationship between mobility and (1) mon-
etary policy, (2) agglomeration economies, and (3) federal safety net programs.
This Part will show that levels of economic activity and growth turn on the ca-
pacity of labor to move to opportunity, and that central pieces of our national
economic architecture- the use of the dollar as a single national currency and
poorer areas from taking them, a flow of migrants may fill those jobs, generating economic
activity, or they might move to less successful areas, providing stimulus to these places. See
Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, io6 MICH. L.
REV. 567, 578 (2008) (describing the differing economic role of immigrants in both "global
cities" like New York and Los Angeles and less prominent locales). Nevertheless, the federal
government will continue to be concerned with high unemployment in poorer areas, and in-
ternational migration will not alleviate the problems for monetary policy - and other fields -
caused by diminished interstate migration. Some policy advocates have encouraged place-
based international-migration policies, which would issue visas to migrants who agree to
live in declining cities like Detroit. Sean Rust & Brandon Fuller, Make Immigration
Reform Local, CITY J. (Spring 2013), http://www.city-joumal.org/html/make-immigration
-reform-local-13558.html [http://perma.cc/CTE2-2Y6Q]. While this is an interesting and
controversial policy proposal, I am generally skeptical of place-based policies for the reasons
discussed below in notes 282-287 and their accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 20, at 15o8-1o (discussing the well-known Tiebout Model of
mobility among towns in a single region, and its discontents).
24. The legal literature on interstate migration is sparse. However, two important exceptions
should be noted. First, Bob Ellickson has argued that various features of property law, as
well as cultural and labor-market differences, explain why Americans are more mobile than
the French. See Robert C. Ellickson, Legal Sources of Residential Lock-Ins: Why French House-
holds Move Ha fas Often as U.S. Households, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 373. Ellickson's work does
not address many of the dynamics discussed in this Article, and focuses instead on demon-
strating that although American law creates stickiness, French law creates more.
Second, in a piece that runs against the grain of this Article, Naomi Schoenbaum argues
that employment and family law do too much to facilitate mobility. See Naomi Schoenbaum,
Mobility Measures, 2012 BYU L. REv. 1169. Schoenbaum argues that laws work to make mo-
bility possible by preventing discrimination, but do not give some of those who bear the
costs of moves - spouses, extended families - a sufficient right to limit mobility. These spe-
cific arguments will be discussed in Section I.D below, but Schoenbaum's article simply does
not address either the costs of falling mobility discussed in this Section or the huge number
of state and local limits on mobility discussed in Part II.
87
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the organization of our social welfare policies - rely on movement by the un-
employed and poor to locations where there are both jobs and a healthy tax
base.
This Article does not paint on a blank canvas. A substantial empirical litera-
ture in economics discusses the evidence and causes of declining interstate mo-
bility.2 5 Yet this literature focuses largely on factors external to federal, state, or
local policy-factors like the aging population or the transition to a service-
based economy. That said, there is a live debate over the role of land-use re-
strictions in causing and shaping the decline in mobility, one which the Article
will turn to in Section II.A.i. This paper does not seek to adjudicate or debunk
these competing causal theories for declining mobility. Rather, it seeks to sup-
plement conventional accounts of interstate mobility by showing how policies,
mostly at the state and local level, impede moves into hot job markets and out
of particularly bad ones. The Article does not attempt to draw a causal link be-
tween these policies and the decline in mobility. Whatever the cause of the de-
cline, policies that impose additional imits on mobility are a national macroe-
conomic problem because, as this Part will show, the central legal and policy
institutions governing the national economy rely on interstate mobility. Thus,
although often overlooked by national-level figures and analysts, these local
policies encouraging stagnation or distortion of interstate mobility have serious
macroeconomic consequences.
A. Monetary Policy and Labor Mobility
By law, the only legal currency in the United States is the dollar.26 While we
take this for granted today, there is no economic reason why the United States
must constitute a single currency area. The United States, Mexico, and Canada
could theoretically emulate the adoption of the Euro and embrace a common
25. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
26. See 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2012) ("United States coins and currency ... are legal tender for all
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currency, the hypothesized "Amero."27 Likewise, if the Constitution did not
forbid it, U.S. states could create their own currencies.28
The fact that the dollar is the sole currency of the United States limits the
possibilities for federal monetary policy. The Federal Reserve must attempt to
match the dollar's value and supply to the needs of the American economy as a
whole, in order to achieve both full employment and price stability.29 It cannot
develop different monetary policies for different regions of the country. For this
reason, laws that inhibit interstate mobility diminish the capacity of the federal
government to manage the economy because they make regions of the Ameri-
can economy less similar. State and local policies can thus make it harder for
the Federal Reserve to achieve its "dual mandate" of employment and price sta-
bility.30
A vast economic literature addresses the question of when it makes sense
for countries or regions to adopt the same currency.3 1 Research on Optimum
27. The possibility of a North American Union has long been the subject of right-wing conspir-
acy theories. See Drake Bennett, The Amero Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2007), http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/world/americas/25iht-25Amero.8473833.html [http://perma
.cc/5PVC-JPX2] (describing the belief that elites are pushing for the creation of a NAFTA
currency).
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, S 10 ("No State shall ... make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a
Tender in Payment of Debts . . . .").
29. See 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2012) ("The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the
Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit
aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase production, so
as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate
long-term interest rates.").
30. Cf Aaron Steelman, The Federal Reserve's "Dual Mandate": The Evolution of an Idea, FED.
RES. BANK RICH. (Dec. 2011), http://www.richmondfed.org/-/media/richmondfedorg
/publications/research/economic-brief/2011/pdf/eb_11-12.pdf [http://perma.cc/GA6C
-9JSU] (describing the history of the Federal Reserve's "dual mandate" to maintain full em-
ployment and stable prices).
31. For the earliest pioneers, see J. Marcus Fleming, On Exchange Rate Unification, 81 ECON.
J. 467 (1971); Peter B. K enen, The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic
View, in MONETARY PROBLEMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 41 (Robert A. Mundell &
Alexander K. Swoboda eds., 1969); Ronald I. McKinnon, Optimum Currency Areas, 53 AM.
ECON. REv. 717 (1963); Robert A. Mundell, A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, 51 AM.
ECON. REv. 657 (1961) [hereinafter Mundell, A Theory]; and Robert A. Mundell, Uncommon
Arguments for Common Currencies, in THE ECONOMICS OF COMMON CURRENCIES 114 (Harry
G. Johnson & Alexander K. Swoboda eds., 1973) [hereinafter Mundell, Uncommon Argu-
ments]. For some more recent scholarship, see Alberto Alesina & Robert J. Barro, Currency
Unions, 117 Q.J. ECON. 409 (2002); Tamim Bayoumi & Barry Eichengreen, Ever Closer to
Heaven? An Optimum-Currency-Area Index for European Countries, 41 EUR. ECON. REV. 761
(1997); Jeffrey A. Frankel & Andrew K. Rose, The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area
Criteria, 1o8 ECoN. J. 1009 (1998); and Atish R. Ghosh & Holger C. Wolf, How Many Mon-
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Currency Areas (OCAs) has been extremely influential on policymaking, par-
ticularly in the debate over the creation, management, and potential dissolution
of the Euro.32
But impressive and extensive as it is, the OCA literature barely addresses
the way laws affect the operation of currency areas. Though the literature dis-
cusses some government outputs apart from monetary policy-particularly the
role of federal taxes and spending in providing transfers across areas in times of
distress - it rarely considers the many ways that laws affect labor mobility, price
setting, or any of the other factors that drive the optimality (or lack thereof) of
currency areas. But laws, often created at subnational levels, clearly do affect
these factors. Of particular interest for this paper, legal regimes that hamper
labor mobility subvert the efficacy of monetary policy.
Research on OCAs began with Robert Mundell's pioneering 1961 piece, A
Theory of Optimum Currency Areas." European scholars had already begun to
debate moving to a common currency, but the idea was viewed as a political
impossibility.34 Mundell thus felt the need to defend his novel insight-that
there is nothing necessary or necessarily attractive about having a currency that
matches the size of a nation-state - as more than "purely academic.""
Mundell's work engaged with a broader literature about the costs and ben-
efits of floating currencies.3 6 Floating currencies -those allowed to appreciate
or depreciate freely rather than remaining pegged to other currencies at specific
exchange rates -are attractive because they allow central banks to respond to
ies? A Genetic Approach to Finding Optimum Currency Areas (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 4805, 1994).
32. See Paul Krugman, Revenge of the Optimum Currency Area, 27 NAT'L BUREAU ECON. RES.
MACROECONOMICs ANN. 439 (2013) (arguing that the crises in the Eurozone are a product of
the fact that it was never an optimum currency area); Alexandre Swoboda, Robert Mundell
and the Theoretical Foundation for the European Monetary Union, INT'L MONETARY FUND:
VIEWS & COMMENTS (Dec. 13, 1999), http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2ol5/o9/28
/04/54/vc121399 [http://perma.cc/3KLM-DDXZ] (discussing the importance of OCA theo-
ry in the development of the Euro).
33. Mundell, A Theory, supra note 31.
34. See J.E. Meade, The Balance-of-Payments Problem of a European Free-Trade Area, 67 ECON. J.
379, 386-88 (1957) (describing European monetary integration as "not a starter at the mo-
ment" and urging scholars not to "sacrifice the present real political possibilities of building
a commercial free-trade area to this ideal of simultaneous monetary and budgetary integra-
tion"); Mundell, A Theory, supra note 31, at 661.
35. Mundell, A Theory, supra note 31, at 657.
36. See id. at 665 (listing among others MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates,
in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953), and SEYMOUR E. HARRIS, INTERNATIONAL AND IN-
TERREGIONAL ECONOMICS (1957), as references).
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demand shocks.17 Imagine two countries, Country A and Country B, with
floating currencies that trade with one another." If Country A faces a negative
shock- say, it is a major copper producer and copper is discovered elsewhere,
reducing the price of copper and the size of Country A's overall economy-it
can increase the supply of money and thereby depreciate the value of its curren-
cy against that of Country B. Circulating more money devalues all goods and
prices in Country A at once, bringing prices across the economy into line with
the new economic reality created by the shock. Country A no longer would
have contracts priced at levels based on its previous level of wealth. This
change encourages economic activity and improves the trade balance with
Country B. The result: full employment in Country A.
But what if Countries A and B have tied the value of their currencies to one
another? Doing so makes transactions between the countries easier, increasing
trade. But if it has fixed the value of its currency and it faces a negative demand
shock, Country A cannot use monetary policy to devalue all goods and wages
simultaneously and maintain full employment (because doing so would threat-
en the fixed relationship of the currencies)." Instead, if Country A hopes to re-
turn to full employment following a negative shock, it has to engage in "inter-
nal devaluation," absorbing the demand shock by reducing wages and the
prices of goods across the economy, contract by contract.4 0 But prices are sticky
and contracts take time to renegotiate, meaning the return to full employment
can be lengthy and difficult (think Greece over the past few years).41 The ad-
vantage of letting currencies float, then, is that doing so helps countries weath-
er shifts in demand by adjusting currency prices rather than by forcing individ-
uals and firms to go through the painful process of adjusting the prices of all
goods and services individually.42
37. Id. at 658-59.
38. The letters associated with the countries in this example are flipped from the way Mundell
used them.
39. Mundell, A Theory, supra note 31, at 658-59. This assumes capital mobility and that Country
B will not allow inflation in order to aid Country A.
40. See Anders Aslund, Why Internal Devaluation Is Advantageous, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L
ECON. (June 6, 2012), http://piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/why-internal
-devaluation-advantageous [http://perma.cc/RW64-XJHD] ("The meaning of internal de-
valuation is to carry out real effective exchange rate depreciation without nominal devalua-
tion.").
41. Mundell, A Theory, supra note 31, at 659 (" [I]n a currency area comprising many regions
and a single currency, the pace of inflation is set by the willingness of central authorities to
allow unemployment in deficit regions.").
42. Id. at 663-64 ("If the world can be divided into regions within each of which there is factor
mobility and between which there is factor immobility, then each of these regions should
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Mundell's brilliant move was to apply this same logic within nation-states.
A national currency (like the U.S. dollar) is just like a set of currencies pegged
to one another.43 The value of the "New York dollar," for example, is pegged to
the "Colorado dollar," the "Florida dollar," and the "California dollar." Having a
common currency across the country has clear benefits. It reduces transaction
costs by obviating the need to change money, and it decreases the financial risk
associated with fluctuating currency prices.44
But the benefits of having a common currency may not outweigh the costs
of forgoing an internally floating currency regime if a country's economy is
sufficiently heterogeneous. Falling oil prices harm the economies of Alaska,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, but benefit the economies of California and
New York. When the Federal Reserve sees falling oil prices, it faces a dilemma:
should it increase the money supply? If it does, it can alleviate unemployment
in the regions that have been harmed, but only at the cost of spurring inflation
elsewhere.4 5 But if it does not increase the money supply, economic dislocation
in oil-producing states will get worse. Having a single currency only makes
sense if the benefit of reduced transaction costs outweighs the cost of not hav-
ing tools to respond to asymmetric shocks.4 6
How do we know when this will be the case? Asymmetric shocks will be
less of a problem, Mundell argued, if there is enough "internal factor mobili-
ty" -the movement of labor and other factors of production from one part of
the currency area to the other.4 7 If the unemployed can move from the harmed
region to the unharmed one, monetary policy interventions become less neces-
sary. "But'" Mundell noted, "if labor and capital are insufficiently mobile within
a country ... one could expect varying rates of unemployment or inflation in
have a separate currency which fluctuates relative to all other currencies . . . . [T] he validity
of the argument for flexible exchange rates [between national currencies] therefore hinges
on the closeness with which nations correspond to regions.").
43. See id. at 659-60.
44. See Krugman, supra note 32, at 440 (describing gains from having a single currency).
45. Mundell, A Theory, supra note 31, at 659 (" [I]n a currency area comprising many regions
and a single currency, the pace of inflation is set by the willingness of central authorities to
allow unemployment in deficit regions.").
46. Id. at 661-63 (describing the practical application of currency reorganization and the benefits
and limitations of having a single currency).
47. Id. at 663-64 ("If the world can be divided into regions within each of which there is factor
mobility and between which there is factor immobility, then each of these regions should
have a separate currency which fluctuates relative to all other currencies . . . . [T] he validity
of the argument for flexible exchange rates [between national currencies] therefore hinges
on the closeness with which nations correspond to regions.").
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the different regions."48 In short, mobility of both labor and capital is the factor
that determines whether a single currency makes sense for a country or set of
countries.
Mundell's work generated a massive literature asking under what circum-
stances economies should or should not be combined into currency areas.
Ronald McKinnon, for example, argued that smaller, trade-dependent econo-
mies benefit less from flexible exchange rates.4 9 Because small, open economies
import most goods, they have less control over internal prices, and currency
devaluations are therefore less effective. Openness to trade thus makes fixed or
single currencies work better.o Peter Kenen focused on the kinds of industries
within countries." He argued that diverse economies absorb asynchronous
shocks better because the losses and gains of various industries offset one an-
other.5 2 These jack-of-all-trades economies therefore make better candidates
for fixed exchange rates or common currencies with other economies. Paul
Krugman, Barry Eichengreen, and others argued that currency zones tend to
get worse over time as places specialize and thus become more likely to face
asynchronous shocks." Mundell's later work focused on the degree to which
currency unions spurred financial integration.54 Because people and banks
from, say, California own stock in and lend money to businesses in Detroit
(and vice versa), the two regions end up sharing the costs of asymmetric losses
and spread risk.
48. Id. at 664.
49. McKinnon, supra note 31, at 722.
50. Id. at 724-25; see also Frankel & Rose, supra note 31 (noting the effect of currency unions on
international trade and international business cycles).
51. See Kenen, supra note 31, at 49-54.
52. Id. at 49-51.
53. See Tamim Bayoumi & Barry Eichengreen, Economic Performance Under Alternative Exchange
Rate Regimes: Some Historical Evidence, in THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 257, 292
(Peter B. Kenen et al. eds., 1994); Paul Krugman, Lessons of Massachusetts for EMU, in AD-
JUSTMENT AND GROWTH IN THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION 241, 260 (Francisco Torres &
Francesco Giavazzi eds., 1993); Paul Krugman & Anthony J. Venables, Integration, Specializa-
tion, and Adjustment, 4o EUR. ECON. REV. 959 (1996).
54. See Mundell, Uncommon Arguments, supra note 31.
ss. McKinnon has argued that Mundell's 1973 work contradicts his path-breaking first take
from 1961. Ronald I. McKinnon, Optimum Currency Areas and Key Currencies: Mundell I Ver-
sus Mundell II, 42 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 689, 689 (2004) (noting a "seeming contradiction
in Mundell's own work"). In the later work, Mundell argued that a common currency area
would encourage risk-sharing benefits between regions that have little or no financial inte-
gration prior to their currency union. See id. at 695. Because floating currencies create ex-
change rate uncertainty and interest rate risk, they also inhibit international portfolio diver-
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The big fish in the OCA literature ultimately disagreed about its most im-
portant application: the Euro.56 Mundell and McKinnon, arguing in favor of
the Euro, focused on the benefits of integration for encouraging the diversifica-
tion of risk." Eichengreen, on the other hand, argued that the Euro would face
difficulties-pointing to labor immobility, asynchronous shocks, and the lim-
ited capacity for E.U.-directed redistribution.5
With the important exception of Marcus Fleming, the classic work in the
literature largely ignored the extensive role of government beyond setting
monetary policy." The quality of monetary policy turns on factors in the real
sification. Therefore, countries that face asymmetric shocks are exactly those countries that
would benefit from the financial integration of a common currency. This conclusion almost
completely undermines Mundell's earlier claim-that countries that face asynchronous
shocks benefit from floating currencies. McKinnon backed "Mundell II" against "Mundell I,'
and he criticized other economists - like Kenen, Eichengreen, and Krugman - for failing to
see that financial integration mitigates asynchronous shocks. See id. at 705-06. After the cri-
ses in Southern Europe in 2010, though, McKinnon's claim looks less powerful.
56. Mundell has been described as the "intellectual father of the Euro." See, e.g., Max Nisen, This
1961 Paper from the 'Father of the Euro' Should Have Been an Ominous Warning for the Euro-
zone, Bus. INSIDER (May 29, 2012, 11:28 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/robert
-mundell-1961-paper-ominous-warning-eurozone-2012-5 [http://perma.cc/32P9-KDSA];
see also Ronald McKinnon, Mundell, the Euro, and Optimum Currency Areas, in MONEY, MAR-
KETS, AND MOBILITY 41, 41 (Thomas J. Courchene ed., 2002) (questioning whether Mundell
deserves his designation as the "intellectual father of the euro"); The Euro Decade and Its
Lessons, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 2, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB12308595
8750448009 [http://perma.cc/27VT-DD4X] (referencing Mundell's perspective on the Eu-
ro's role in the 2008 financial crisis).
57. See McKinnon, supra note 56.
58. Barry Eichengreen, Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 3579, 1991), http://www.nber.org/papers/w3579.pdf [http://perma.cc
/RA2Q-HTD 7 ].
59. Fleming focused mostly on the role of fiscal transfers from the central government to re-
gions facing negative economic shocks, and taxes on regions facing positive ones. The exist-
ence of such a system-which exists in the U.S. but not really in the Eurozone-is now seen
as a crucial factor in the success of currency areas. See J. Marcus Fleming, On Exchange Rate
Unification, 81 ECON. J. 467, 478 (1971) (observing that policy integration within an OCA-
including " [c] ertain types of co-ordination, centralisation or harmonisation of the economic
policies of the member countries of a unified exchange rate area"- can help mitigate asym-
metric shocks and reduce the costs of rate rigidity). But he did address other aspects of gov-
ernment policy, including subnational policies. Importantly, he discussed the way policy
affects inflationary behavior and price setting across regions, noting that public policy affects
the speed of internal devaluation. Id. at 476-78. Labor policy, antitrust, and consumer regu-
lation laws all make wages more or less sticky. He also argued that "similarit[ies] in rates of
inflation" make currency areas more optimal, as do similarities in rates of productivity
growth and "degree of trade union aggressiveness, all of which are responsive to local policy-
making." Id. at 476.
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economy, and those factors respond to changes in local, state, and federal poli-
cy. The optimality of a currency area depends upon labor mobility, integration
of financial markets, the diversity of regional economies, and the differences in
price setting across regions. The literature has incorporated levers of macroe-
conomic policy, like taxes and transfers across regions. But the literature pays
little attention to the fact that the degree and type of integration between econ-
omies depends on a variety of laws and policies.60
As applied here, the upshot is that state and local laws that limit labor mo-
bility clearly reduce the degree to which the United States is an OCA.6 1 These
policies can prevent monetary policy from simultaneously matching the needs
of tight markets with rising prices (like San Francisco) and slack ones with fall-
ing prices and high unemployment (like Atlantic City).62 Indeed, there is sug-
So. One aspect of subnational government has recently become part of the literature: debt. The
recent crises in Greece and throughout Europe forced the problem of debt taken out by enti-
ties smaller than the size of a currency area into the OCA literature. See, e.g., Michael D.
Bordo et al., A Fiscal Union for the Euro: Some Lessons from History, 59 CESIFo ECON. STUD.
449 (2013). Excessive subnational borrowing creates particular risks for currency unions.
States and the banks that lend to them face moral hazard problems: they expect that the
people who run the central bank will do anything to protect the reputation of the broader
currency area and this will almost guarantee a bailout. Common-pool problems follow, as
states rush to spend lest they lose out on access to the bailout.
61. The likelihood that prices change in similar ways in different regions is also heavily depend-
ent on state and local regimes. Minimum wage laws differ from state to state and city to city.
Wage & Hour Div., Minimum Wage Laws in the States-January 1, 2017, U.S. DEP'T LAB. (Jan.
1, 2017), http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm [http://perma.cc/G3K3-BK4X]
(surveying differences in minimum wage laws across the states); see also Taylor Malmsheim-
er, The Future of Minimum Wage Will Be Decided in Cities, NEw REPUBLIC (Aug. 1, 2014),
http://newrepublic.com/article/18912/city-specific-minimum-wage-policies-are
-increasing [http://perma.cc/SXPF-7JLE] (chronicling the rise of local minimum wage
laws). Similarly, some states do not allow unions to contract with employers to require all
employees to join the union (so-called "right-to-work" states). Right-To-Work Resources,
NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment
/right-to-work-laws-and-bills.aspx [http://perma.cc/M4AF-G7KW] (noting that as of Feb-
ruary 2017, twenty-eight states and Guam have right-to-work laws). These states have fewer
union members and some studies suggest this causes wages to decrease more easily. Alan
Greenblatt, Right-to-Work Laws Top Republican Wish Lists, GOVERNING (Feb. 25, 2016),
http://www.governing.com/topics/mgmt/gov-states-right-to-work-laws-unions.html
[http://perma.cc/74F3-TTFK]. State and local governments employ nearly thirteen percent
of the population, see Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment by Major Industry Sector, U.S.
DEP'T LAB. (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep table_201.htm [http://perma.cc
/DBT 5-EGLR], and governments' willingness or capacity to lower or increase wages turns
on local political factors. All of these policy decisions happen far from the marble halls of the
Federal Reserve, but they nonetheless affect the quality of the dollar-zone as an OCA.
62. In an interesting study, Mike Konczal and Marshall Steinbaum argue that slack labor mar-
kets, and not policy limitations on mobility, explain the fall in job switching and a decline in
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gestive evidence that declining mobility, among other factors, can help explain
some of the challenges the Federal Reserve has faced in setting monetary policy
over the last forty years. The famed destabilization of the "Phillips Curve" - the
concept that there exists an inverse relationship between inflation and unem-
ployment- since the 1970s does not show up in regional data. In other words,
regional economies have continued to see relatively stable tradeoffs between
inflation and unemployment-when unemployment goes up, inflation goes
down-even as the national economy does not always exhibit this tradeoff. 63
This suggests that the reason monetary policy has become a less successful tool
for balancing inflation and unemployment is that regional economies have di-
verged from one another in important ways.
B. Wealth, Growth, and Labor Mobility
Another major strand of economic theory, "agglomeration economics,"
shows why interstate labor mobility is essential to the economy.64 The basic in-
sight of this work is simple: location matters. When people and capital congre-
gate in particular cities and regions, they learn and trade more easily, and this
creates wealth and generates economic growth.65 Restrictions on mobility limit
the capacity of people and capital to combine, which in turn results in fewer
gains from agglomeration.66
geographic mobility. Mike Konczal & Marshall Steinbaum, Declining Entrepreneurship, Labor
Mobility, and Business Dynamism: A Demand-Side Approach, ROOSEVELT INST. (July 21, 2016),
http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2o16/o7/Declining-Entrepreneurship
-Labor-Mobility-and-Business-Dynamism-A-Demand-Side-Approach.pdf [http://perma.cc
/6G9S-2YQD]. But job-market slack results in part from monetary policy. When inflation
and unemployment hit different regions differently, the Federal Reserve cannot reduce un-
employment and keep prices steady as easily. And so, an inflation-averse Federal Reserve
may create labor-market slack in part because of limits on mobility.
63. Terry Fitzgerald et al., Is There a Stable Phillips Curve After All?, REGION, Dec. 2013, at 4,
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/-/media/files/pubs/region/13-12/region-december-2013
full issue.pdf [http://perma.cc/6ERL-WHFC].
64. I have extensively reviewed this literature elsewhere. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 11, at
1686-91; Schleicher, supra note 20, at 1515-29. For more reviews of the literature, see al-
so MASAHISA FUJITA, PAUL KRUGMAN & ANTHONY J. VENABLES, THE SPATIAL ECONOMY: CIT-
IES, REGIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1-6 (1999); and EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES, AG-
GLOMERATION AND SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM 1-14 (2008).
65. See Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY ECON. 3,
38-39 (1988); Schleicher, supra note 11, at 1687-89.
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While the history of this idea goes back quite far - at least to Adam Smith -
the classic articulation of the theory of agglomeration economics comes from
Alfred Marshall.67 Marshall articulated three distinct gains from co-location:
reduction in shipping costs for goods, the advantages of deep markets, and in-
formation spillovers between neighbors.6 8 These gains offset the costs of densi-
ty, referred to as "congestion" in the literature, which include higher rents,
traffic, pollution, and crime.6 9
During the early and middle parts of the twentieth century, a great deal of
academic literature argued that difficulties in matching people and jobs could
be a major impediment to national economic growth.70 Most notably, in the
1950s and 196os, a group of economists and demographers, including Richard
Easterlin, Simon Kuznets, and Dorothy Thomas, published a massive three-
volume study demonstrating that a lack of interstate migration could impede
growth and employment." This literature, for all of its merits, did not provide
much of a microfoundation for how migration patterns worked or why jobs did
not simply move to workers rather than the other way around. And for most of
67. See 1 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 266-277 (8th ed. 1920).
68. Id.; see also Schleicher, supra note 20, at 1516-28 (describing these three categories of ag-
glomeration gains).
69. See Edward L. Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 139, 150 (1998)
("At some point, the benefits of agglomeration are overwhelmed by the costs of congestion,
and cities stop growing." (citation omitted)). Previously, I have divided these negative con-
sequences of density into traditional congestion costs - things like rent or crime that increase
as a pure outgrowth of density - and "negative agglomerations,' or bad things that get worse
for reasons exactly like the reasons agglomerations produce gains. Schleicher, supra note 20,
at 1528-29 (discussing congestion costs and negative agglomeration gains). Certain types of
crime, for example, can be understood as negative agglomerations; thieves, for instance,
should be more effective in dense areas due to labor-market depth (particularly specializa-
tion), learning from one another, and reduced shipping costs (e.g., from robber to fence).
70. See, e.g., CARTER GOODRICH ET AL., MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 670 (1936)
(arguing, following a massive study of the history of economic migration in the United
States, that the federal government should "ease and facilitate" internal migration through
labor laws, social insurance, and interventions designed to limit state and local governmen-
tal efforts to stem migration); DOROTHY S. THOMAS, RESEARCH MEMORANDUM ON MIGRA-
TION DIFFERENTIALS (1938) (discussing differential likelihoods of populations to migrate);
Warren S. Thompson, The Distribution of Population, 188 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 250, 255-56 (1936) (discussing the importance of differentials in economic opportunity
as a driver of migration).
71. See 1 POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: UNITED STATES 1870-1950
(Simon Kuznets & Dorothy Thomas eds., 1957); 2 POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION AND Eco-
NoMIC GROWTH: UNITED STATES 1870-1950 (Simon Kuznets & Dorothy Thomas eds.,
1960); 3 POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: UNITED STATES 1870-1950
(Simon Kuznets & Dorothy Thomas eds., 1964).
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the twentieth century, only a small group of urban economists studied agglom-
eration economies.
But the field blossomed in the 198os and 1990s when scholars used it to
better understand the economics of international trade.72 Neoclassical econom-
ics could not easily explain how and when industries would cluster in a particu-
lar city." Masahisa Fujita, Paul Krugman, and Anthony Venables developed a
model to answer just this question.74 They showed that changes in shipping
costs for intermediate goods can explain where firms locate. According to their
model, firms spread out completely when shipping costs are either infinite or
zero." In the first case, there can be no trade; in the second, cost-free shipping
allows firms to take advantage of the cheapest land rents, no matter how far
away from the consumer. But if shipping costs are substantial but not infinite -
as in most cases -firms have an incentive to cluster close to one another. Pro-
ducers of intermediate goods (like companies that manufacture axles for cars)
want to move near producers of final goods (like car manufacturers). That way,
only the final producers pay shipping costs.
If shipping costs begin to fall, the incentive for firms to co-locate decreas-
es.76 For a period of time, firms will remain clustered because the cluster itself
provides gains. But if shipping costs fall far enough, firms will spread out
again.
The important insight from this work is that the relationship between firm
location and shipping costs is nonlinear. If there are clusters of firms (i.e., cit-
ies) but shipping costs then fall enough to cause firms to spread out, they will
remain spread out even if shipping costs rise again." Consider manufacturing
agglomeration in Cleveland, Ohio. Metal working and chemical companies
formed in and moved to Cleveland to be close to its dominant steel, iron, and
petroleum-refining industries, and then to each other." As shipping costs fell,
72. See Schleicher, supra note 20, at 1518 n.58 (explaining the link between international trade
theory and the development of agglomeration economics); see also Steven Brakman & Ben J.
Heijdra, Introduction to THE MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION REVOLUTION IN RETROSPECT 1,
32-35 (Steven Brakman & Ben J. Heijdra eds., 2004).
73. See Schleicher, supra note 20, at 1518.
74. See generally FUJITA, KRUGMAN &VENABLES, supra note 64.
75. See Schleicher, supra note 20, at 1518-19 (citing FUJITA, KRUGMAN & VENABLES, supra note
64, at 61, 67-68, 74).
76. See id.
77. See id. at 1519-20.
78. Darwin H. Stapleton, Industry, CASE W. RES. U. ENCYCLOPEDIA CLEVELAND HIST., http://
case.edu/ech/articles/i/industry [http://perma.cc/T9BK-6W32] (describing rise of indus-
tries related to steel and iron in Cleveland).
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manufacturers dispersed around the country and the world, and there was no
longer as large a concentration of firms in Cleveland to attract new entrants.7 9
So even if shipping costs later increased back to their original high levels, there
would not be much reason for departed manufacturers to return back to Cleve-
land in their previous numbers. They would likely cluster again, if conditions
were right, but there is no reason to believe they would cluster in Cleveland. All
the king's horses and all the king's men can't quite put Cleveland back together
again.o
The history of urban location in the United States follows this model quite
closely. As Edward Glaeser and Janet Kohlhase show, the biggest cities in
America sprouted up on shipping routes - either near ports, railroad hubs, or
both." Manufacturing firms moved near these hubs to reach the national mar-
ket, and the makers of intermediate goods followed close behind. The precipi-
tous decline in shipping costs over the twentieth century-brought about by
inventions like the internal combustion engine and the shipping container -
meant that manufacturing firms could spread out, leading to the decline of the
modern manufacturing city.
The cities and metropolitan areas that have thrived in the last forty years
have been those with advantages rooted in other agglomeration economies,
particularly deep labor markets in high-end service industries.82 A primary ag-
glomeration benefit of deeper labor markets is that they simultaneously allow
79. Paul Atkins et al., Responding to Manufacturing Job Loss: What Can Economic Development Pol-
icy Do?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (June 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/wp-content
/uploads/2o16/o6/o6_manufacturing job_1oss.pdf [http://perma.cc/3BQK-V4AP] ("Be-
tween 1980 and 2005, Cleveland lost about 110,300 manufacturing jobs, or 42.5% of its
manufacturing employment."); see also Edward L. Glaeser & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, Did
the Death of Distance Hurt Detroit and Help New York?, in AGGLOMERATION ECONOMICS 303,
303-05 (Edward L. Glaeser ed., 2010) ("Reductions in transport costs reduce the advantages
associated with making goods in the Midwest, but they increase the returns to producing
new ideas in New York . . .. When the costs of distance fall, manufacturing firms leave the
city, which causes a decline in urban income and property values. The economy as a whole is
getting more productive as the city's advantage in production is disappearing. This effect
captures the decline in erstwhile manufacturing powerhouses like Cleveland and Detroit.").
8o. Even King James. Travis Waldron, No, LeBron James Won't Bring $5oo Million a Year to Cleve-
land's Economy, THINK PROGRESS (July 15, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/sports/2014/07
/15/346o194/no-lebron-james-wont-bring-5oo-million-a-year-to-clevelands-economy
[http://perma.cc/WQN6-J4NN].
81. Edward L. Glaeser & Janet E. Kohlhase, Cities, Regions and the Decline of Transport Costs, 83
PAPERS REGIONAL SCl. 197, 198 (2004).
82. See Glaeser & Ponzetto, supra note 79, at 303, 303-05.
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greater specialization and reduce firm-specific risk." For example, actors in Los
Angeles have all sorts of advantages over actors in Milwaukee. A Los Angeles
actor can increase his wages by specializing in, say, the role of a zombie or ma-
fia henchman. By contrast, a Milwaukee actor has to play whatever roles he can
come by. A Los Angeles actor can safely invest in human capital knowing that
there will be jobs he can access without moving. The Los Angeles actor has "in-
surance" that a firm-specific failure -the owner of a theater investing with Ber-
nie Madoff, for example - will not leave him jobless and forced to move. On the
other hand, a similar firm-specific failure at one of the relatively few theaters in
Milwaukee could end an actor's career in that city.
Beyond the benefits of specialization and risk reduction, deep markets also
allow for the capture of information spillovers that increase wealth and drive
growth.84 In Silicon Valley, for example, software developers and venture capi-
talists learn just by having coffee with friends. A tech savant in Jacksonville,
Florida would have no such opportunity to learn from peers. Lobbyists in D.C.
learn from one another over dinner in Capitol Hill, becoming better at their
jobs with each bit of gossip or scrap of insight into legislative procedure." Wall
Street types learn about how to structure deals over steaks and cocktails at The
21 Club. And so forth. As Robert Lucas noted, "New York City's garment dis-
trict, financial district, diamond district, advertising district and many more are
as much intellectual centers as is Columbia or New York University."8 6
Glaeser and Giacomo Ponzetto have shown that cities with these ad-
vantages have seen growth despite decreasing shipping costs. 7 Wages have
soared in San Francisco, Boston, and New York as high-skilled workers have
flocked to take advantage of these agglomeration economies." In a world
where the costs of shipping goods are low but the opportunity costs of trans-
porting people remain high, cities built on service economies have thrived."
83. See Glaeser, supra note 69, at 145-46 (discussing actors' gains from colocation); Schleicher,
supra note 20, at 1520-23 (describing the gains from labor-market depth).
84. Michel Serafinelli, "Good" Firms, Worker Flows and Local Productivity 1-6 (Dep't of Econ.,
Univ. of Toronto, Working Paper No. 538, 2015), http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public
/workingPapers/tecipa-538.pdf [http://perma.cc/R2C9-QGFY].
85. See Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 66, at 651.
86. Lucas, supra note 65, at 38.
87. See Glaeser & Ponzetto, supra note 79, at 304.
88. Id. at 308-11.
89. The opportunity cost of transporting people has increased, as the time it takes to travel has
not decreased as quickly as wages have increased. While manufacturers no longer need to
co-locate, workers who work in service industries and capture the gains of knowledge spill-
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The nature of the economy determines the type of city that succeeds, and this
dynamic can change rapidly.
This brief review of the agglomeration-economics literature provides three
important takeaways about interstate mobility. First, you can't go home again.
Once cities decline, they will not come back in the same form. Car companies
and parts suppliers are not likely to return to Detroit in the same numbers. A
city may return to economic health, but it will not be for the same reasons. As a
result, it has been detrimental for Detroit to have an infrastructure, population,
and government tailored to the existence of an automobile industry that is nev-
er going to return. Cities must have the capacity to shrink their physical forms,
their populations, and their governments when economic maladies, or simply
economic changes, hit.
Second, individuals must be mobile to capture the gains from agglomera-
tion. Agglomeration models, self-consciously, are premised on simple concepts
of locational choice. In other words, these models assume that there are costs
each time goods are shipped, but that firms and people can cheaply and easily
move their base of location.0 In theory, this easy movement creates a "spatial
equilibrium," a condition in which there are no rents to be had from simply liv-
ing in a region." When there is local economic growth, people move in. This
spreads the gains from that local growth among a larger and larger group of
people, until there is no incentive for the marginal resident to move to the city.
As a result of the population moving to capture agglomeration gains, there is
no greater economic advantage in these models from living in one region or
city than there is from living in another.
But in practice, people are not moving, and localized economic booms have
not produced "boomtowns." As discussed both above and below, New York,
San Francisco, Silicon Valley, and a few other cities have seen massive wage
growth over the last twenty years, but not massive inflows of population.92
Economists like Glaeser and Krugman have turned to land-use restrictions to
overs and deep labor markets continue to have strong incentives to live and work in the
same metropolitan areas. Id.
go. See, e.g., GLAESER, supra note 64, at 4 (noting that basic agglomeration models assume mo-
bile populations, an assumption that can be criticized); FUJITA, CRUGMAN & VENABLEs, supra
note 64, at 62 (assuming mobile manufacturing labor). For models seeking to explain firm
location internationally, labor is often completely immobile. Id. at 311 (noting that for their
trade models, labor is immobile and only prices adjust).
91. GLAESER, supra note 64, at 4-5.
92. See Schleicher, supra note II, at 1674-75.
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explain this fact." Though demand in these regions has predictably increased,
restrictive land-use laws limit building and thus inward migration. As I will
discuss below, these land-use restrictions are just one element of the set of legal
limitations on interstate mobility.94
Third, when people and firms fail to move to agglomeration economies, the
overall economy loses both output and growth. Actors are more productive in
Los Angeles because of its deep labor market." Tech firms and tech workers are
more innovative and better compensated in Silicon Valley. Wage growth is
higher in dense areas.96 Further, deep labor markets drive investment in human
capital and specialized education, as workers can be confident that there will be
job openings that demand their newly gained skills. 9 7 These effects are grow-
ing. In the last five years, a huge majority of jobs with high wages emerged in
just a few metropolitan areas.9" Wage differentials between cities for similar
jobs have increased over the past forty years; wages for all types of jobs have
increased much more quicldy in areas with high levels of human capital.99 In
short, if people cannot move to booming areas and take advantage of agglom-
eration benefits, the whole economy suffers.
Economists use estimates of these lost labor market gains - that is, the
higher wages people would earn in more productive regions-to estimate the
93. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Houston, New York Has a Problem, CITY J., Summer 2008,
http://www.city-journal.org/html/houston-new-york-has-problem-13102.html [http://
perma.cc/LY8W-TVA2] (describing the comparatively low level of land-use restrictions in
Houston, Texas relative to New York, New York, making the latter "less affordable to the
less successful"); Paul Krugman, Opinion, That Hissing Sound, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 8, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/o8/o8/opinion/that-hissing-sound.html [http://perma.cc
/8J8U-A 7G4] (describing how the land-use restrictions in the middle-United States make it
harder to build new homes).
94. For the rest of the story, see infra Part II.
95. See Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 66, at 642 (discussing gains for actors from deep la-
bor markets).
96. See Edward L. Glaeser & David C. Mar6, Cities and Skills, 19 J. LAB. ECON. 316, 318 (2001)
(finding that individuals in cities experience a wage premium relative to non-urban areas,
and arguing that this wage premium is most likely the result of wage growth).
97. Cf Daron Acemoglu, A Microfoundation for Social Increasing Returns in Human Capital Accu-
mulation, iII Q.J. ECON. 779, 779-81 (1996) (arguing that when firms invest more to attract
high human capital, it creates a positive externality where workers also invest more in edu-
cation, and even those who do not "end up working with more physical capital and [thus]
earn[] an increased rate of return").
g8. Richard Florida, Where the Good jobs Are, ATLANTIC: CITY LAB (Sept. 2, 2016), http://
www.citylab.com/work/2o16/o9/where-the-good-jobs-are/498323 [http://perma.cc/EJ3U
-KLYH] (noting extremely concentrated high-wage job growth between 2011 and 2016).
99. ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS 88-107 (2012).
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cost of land-use restrictions. In a blockbuster study, economists Chang-Tai
Hsieh and Enrico Moretti found that land-use restriction lowered aggregate
U.S. growth by more than 50% from 1964 to 2009. Overall output would have
been 8.9% higher if just New York, San Francisco, and Silicon Valley lowered
regulatory constraints.'oo
Though some studies find smaller effects,o1 even Hsieh and Moretti un-
derstate the true effects of limits on entry in one important way. They focus on-
ly on the loss of higher wages that workers would receive in places like San
Francisco or New York. Limits on entry may have an even more concerning
effect: the loss of innovation. As noted, increased density and better fit between
people and places lead to the generation of new ideas.10 2 More frequent interac-
tions between people can lead to new ideas, and these ideas drive economic
growth. For example, in patent applications, inventors cite other local inventors
at far higher rates than they cite nonlocal inventors.0 3 Jane Jacobs has argued
that interactions between people working for different kinds of firms lead to
cross-fertilization and new ideas.104
While we don't really know where new ideas come from, limiting locational
choice likely stifles innovation. An Atlantic City resident might be capable of
developing an incredible new iPhone app, but it would prove difficult for her to
100. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation (Nat'l Bu-
reau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21,154, 2015, revised May 2017).
101. See, e.g., Devin Bunten, Is the Rent Too High? Aggregate Implications of Local Land-Use
Regulation 1 (Fed. Reserve Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2017-064,
2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2980048 [http://perma.cc/HF7B-NADD] (finding that
abolishing zoning regulations would "increase GDP by 6%, but lower welfare" due to con-
gestion, although optimal zoning (much less restrictive than today's) would increase GDP
by 2.1% and welfare by 1.4%); Ed Glaeser & Joe Gyourko, The Economic Implications of
Housing Supply 23-24 (Zell/Lurie, Working Paper No. 802, 2017), http://realestate.wharton
.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/802.pdf [http://perma.cc/QVJ2-CKTM] (esti-
mating the costs to be 15% of GDP, but then arguing that, because of recent empirical esti-
mates of city-level labor elasticity, an estimate of 2% may be more reasonable). One recent
paper found a larger effect, that reducing the level of land-use restrictions in all states to that
of half of the 2014 Texas level would increase U.S. labor productivity by 17% and consump-
tion by 14%. Kyle F. Herkenhoff, Lee E. Ohanian & Edward C. Prescott, Tarnishing the
Golden and Empire States: Land-Use and the U.S. Economic Slowdown 4 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23790, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23790
[http://perma.cc/U2C2-96831.
102. See Schleicher, supra note 20, at 1523-28 (reviewing literature on agglomeration and growth).
103. Adam B. Jaffe et al., Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Ci-
tations, 1o8 Q.J. EcON. 577, 577 (1993).
104. JANE JACOBS, THE ECONOMY OF CITIES 50-55 (1969) (arguing that new ideas and firms
spring from interactions between people working in different types of jobs).
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make it a reality without the creative ferment and potential business partners
with complementary skills that she could find in Silicon Valley. As a result, pol-
icies that inhibit interstate mobility harm not only the creation of wealth, but
also innovation and growth. And stunted growth rates compound over time,
thus significantly harming welfare.
C. Inequality, Safety Nets, and Labor Mobility
One final branch of social science research that has addressed the interplay
between mobility and economic well-being is the large literature on "neighbor-
hood effects" in poverty relief.as Scholars in this area, however, have primarily
considered whether and how moving from one neighborhood to another with-
in the same region influences labor market, criminal, health, or educational
outcomes. To date, the study of neighborhood effects has not focused on the
impact of moving to a completely different city or state.106
For example, the famous "Moving to Opportunity" program, launched by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1994, created a lottery
system in five cities that gave vouchers to some public housing residents that
they could use to move into low-poverty neighborhoods.' The resulting data
spawned countless studies and continues to yield insights into the role neigh-
borhoods play in determining labor and education outcomes.os Similarly, a
number of prominent studies resulted from the remedial program that fol-
lowed the Supreme Court's decision in Hills v. Gautreaux, which resulted in the
105. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING NEIGH-
BORHOOD EFFECT 46 (2012).
io6. See, e.g., David Freedman & George W. Woods, Neighborhood Effects, Mental Illness and Crim-
inal Behavior: A Review, 6 J. POL. & L. 1 (2013) (reviewing the social science on neighbor-
hood effects as an independent source in shaping outcomes for the poor); Robert J.
Sampson et al., Assessing "Neighborhood Effects": Social Processes and New Directions in Re-
search, 28 ANN. REV. SoC. 443 (2002) (assessing the neighborhood effects literature).
107. See A Summary Overview of Moving to Opportunity: A Random Assignment Housing Mobility
Study in Five U.S. Cities, NAT'L BUREAU ECON. RES. (2008), http://www.nber.org
/mtopublic/MTO%200verview%2oSummary.pdf [http://perma.cc/XQU7-TRR4].
io8. See, e.g., XAVIER DE SouzA BRIGGS ET AL., MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY: THE STORY OF AN
AMERICAN EXPERIMENT To FIGHT GHETTO POVERTY (2010); Susan Clampet-Lundquist &
Douglas S. Massey, Neighborhood Effects on Economic Self-Sufficiency: A Reconsideration of the
Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 114 AM. J. Soc. 107 (2008); Jeffrey R. Kling et al., Experi-
mental Analysis of Neighborhood Effects, 75 ECONOMETRICA 83 (2007).
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relocation of thousands of Chicago families in public housing to other neigh-
borhoods in and around Chicago.o0
Policy recommendations in the wake of such studies naturally considered
the relationship between anti-poverty spending and locational decisions inside
a metropolitan area. Yet this literature, as impressive and important as it is,
does not address the role of interregional moves in reducing poverty. In failing
to do so, it misses a key ingredient in the functioning of a proper welfare sys-
tem.
First, employment rates can differ far more substantially across states or re-
gions than across a metropolitan area.o If workers in a Rust Belt city where
the manufacturing industry has collapsed were able to move not merely to a
nearby suburb, but across the country to high-wage, low-unemployment re-
gions like Boston or the Bay Area, they would see greater labor market oppor-
tunities."' Such increases in opportunity would lessen the need for federal
benefits, with increased labor-market income replacing after-tax redistribution.
Second, state and local governments fund a great deal of welfare policy.
Federal programs like Medicaid and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) require matching funds from states.112 Further, despite fear of incen-
109. 425 U.S. 284, 306 (1976). For a comprehensive review of the implementation of the Gau-
treaux program, see LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ & JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS
AND COLOR LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA (2000). For studies of the
Gautreaux data and policy recommendations relating to inter-city mobility, see Micere K eels
et al., Fiteen Years Later: Can Residential Mobility Programs Provide a Long-Term Escape from
Neighborhood Segregation, Crime, and Poverty?, 42 DEMOGRAPHY 51 (2005); Ruby Mendenhall
et al., Neighborhood Resources, Racial Segregation, and Economic Mobility: Results from the Gau-
treaux Program, 35 Soc. Scl. RES. 892 (20o6); and James E. Rosenbaum, Changing the Geog-
raphy of Opportunity by Expanding Residential Choice: Lessons from the Gautreaux Program, 6
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 231 (1995).
11o. For example, consider the difference between North Dakota, which in July 2017 enjoyed the
nation's lowest unemployment rate at 2.2%, and Alaska, which has a 7% unemployment rate.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, State Employment and Unemployment-July 2017, U.S. DEP'T LAB.
(Aug. 18, 2017), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/laus.pdf [http://perma.cc/8RK(A
-55CQ]. Employment rates vary even more substantially across different cities. In January
2017, El Centro, California had a 21.2% unemployment rate versus the San Francisco Bay Ar-
ea's 3.6% unemployment rate. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 1. Civilian Labor Force and
Unemployment by Metropolitan Area, Seasonally Adjusted, U.S. DEP'T LAB. (Mar. 17, 2017),
http://www.bls.gov/web/metro/ssamatabi.txt [http://perma.cc/Z5P5-L24Z].
iii. For an interactive look at such differences, see Gregor Aisch et al., The Best and Worst Areas
To Grow Up: How Your Area Compares, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2015/05/03/upshot/the-best-and-worst-places-to-grow-up-how-your-area
-compares.html [http://perma.cc/4MNY-2S5N].
112. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, §§ 101-116, 110 Stat. 2105, 2110-85 (creating the TANF program); Social Security
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tivizing exit, localities also engage in a substantial amount of economic redis-
tribution."' Addressing homelessness, for instance, is almost always a local re-
sponsibility.1 14 Most notably, public education has a huge redistributive ele-
ment - although not always downward- for which states and localities provide
about ninety percent of the funding.1
The crucial role played by state and local governments has major implica-
tions for federal welfare policy. If states and localities are responsible for fund-
ing a large part of social safety net spending, it is critical that poor people move
to places where there are wealthier people and businesses to support those wel-
fare programs. Under ordinary conditions, this mobility proceeds naturally-
rich and poor alike are drawn to places that provide economic opportunity.1 16
But policies that interfere with mobility will lead to an increasing mismatch be-
tween state and local fiscal capacity and the needs for services and redistribu-
tion. For the federal government, alleviating poverty will simply be more costly
if poor people are largely concentrated in states and localities that have fewer
resources to offer.117
Decreased mobility across states and regions also raises intergenerational
concerns. Raj Chetty and others used the Moving to Opportunity data to ana-
lyze the impact of neighborhoods on educational outcomes for students.1
Their findings suggest that, regardless of whether mobility inside a metropoli-
tan area affects adult labor market outcomes, geography determines which
Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (guaranteeing matching funds to
states for qualifying Medicaid expenditures); see David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federal-
ism, 118 HAlv. L. REv. 2544 (2005).
113. Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial Intervention, 101
Nw. U. L. REV. 1057, 1060-65 (2007) (describing the widespread nature of local redistribu-
tive programs in the United States).
114. Robert W. Collin, Homelessness: The Policy and the Law, 16 URB. LAw. 317, 322, 329 (1984).
115. The Federal Role in Education, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. (May 25, 2017), http://www2.ed.gov/about
/overview/fed/role.html [http://perma.cc/J8XZ-64TQ].
116. This is not to say that, absent regulatory hurdles, all (or even most) poor people would be
able to leave poor places with little capacity to provide local services. Rather, it is simply to
say that the more poor people move to richer areas, the easier it is for the social safety net to
cover them.
117. See, e.g., Alana Semuels, A Better Way To Help the Long-Term Unemployed, ATLANTIC (Feb.
10, 2015) http://www.theatantic.com/business/archive/2015/o2/a-better-way-to-help-the
-long-term-unemployed/385298 [http://perma.cc/6P2J-AEL] (noting that "states grap-
pling with tight budgets have lost their sympathy for the long-term unemployed as the
economy turns a corner" and have reduced unemployment benefits accordingly).
118. Raj Chetty et al., The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods: New Evidence from the Mov-
ing to Opportunity Experiment, 1o6 AM. ECON. REv. 855 (2016).
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schools students can attend and is thus a key factor in educational outcomes.9̀
School quality differs widely not just across neighborhoods within a metropoli-
tan region, but also across the country. Limits on access to regions with high-
quality schools and neighborhoods thus can negatively influence the educa-
tional outcomes of future generations.12 0
Intergenerational socioeconomic mobility also varies substantially across
different regions in the United States.12 1 For example, as Chetty and others
have found, "the probability that a child reaches the top quintile of the national
income distribution starting from a family in the bottom quintile is 4.4% in
Charlotte but 12.9% in San Jose."122 Areas with residential segregation and con-
centrated poverty score worst on this socioeconomic mobility test.123 Social
safety net policies are expressly aimed at encouraging mobility up the socioeco-
nomic ladder. Encouraging interstate mobility-that is, facilitating migration
from low-opportunity places like Charlotte to more promising cities like San
Jose -is thus central to that mission.
D. When Is Labor Mobility a Problem? Stasis as a Good, Although One Well
Understood by State and Local Governments
While the previous Sections have explored the benefits of mobility, it is also
important to acknowledge the benefits of staying in place. People form deep
attachments to the places in which they choose to live and may not want to
leave behind a particular job, school, or church. Nothing in this Article sug-
gests we should force people to leave places, or even provide net incentives for
them to move.124 Rather, the Article argues that we should not impede mobility,
119. Raj Chetty et al., Where Is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility
in the United States 31, 38, 60 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19,843,
2014).
120. Education Week provides rankings of state educational systems, and reveals, inter alia, wide
disparities in educational outcomes between states. For example, while only 17.2% of eighth
graders in Alabama were found to be "proficient in math," 50.8% of eighth graders in Mas-
sachusetts satisfied that standard. Educ. Week Research Ctr., National Highlights Report
2016, EDUC. WK. (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.edweek.org/media/ew/qc/2o16/shr/16shr.us
.h35.pdf [http://perma.cc/36CD-3TDX].
121. Chetty et al., supra note 119, at 25, 42.
122. Id. at 42.
123. Id. at 34-38.
124. The conclusion does suggest providing subsidies for mobility, but only as a second-best so-
lution to overcome barriers created by other policies.
107
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
instead allowing people to choose communities and labor markets as freely as
possible.
But there are serious arguments that impeding mobility creates benefits,
too. Many of these claims are encapsulated in the well-worked-out debate over
homeownership subsidies, which will be discussed in depth later on. Support-
ers of the home mortgage interest deduction or government-sponsored mort-
gage subsidies stress a number of different benefits of homeownership for buy-
ers, including the utility of a home as a savings device.125 But the central plank
of their argument is that homeowners move less and care more about their
communities.12
Supporters of homeownership subsidies argue that residential stability and
personal investment lead to communal benefits. Homeowners are more likely
to invest in their communities and in their own homes than are fly-by-night
renters, it is claimed, contributing to the creation of local amenities.127 Because
it is costly to move and because the value of their biggest asset (their home) is
tied to the quality of their neighborhood, homeowners will participate in par-
ent-teacher association meetings,12 vote,19 and so on.so Brian McCabe has
shown that tenure in a community is more important to most types of local
participation (except for voting) than homeownership on its own."' Long ten-
125. See BRIAN J. MCCABE, No PLACE LIKE HOME: WEALTH, COMMUNITY AND THE POLITICS OF
HOMEOWNERSHIP 119-33 (2016) (summarizing arguments in defense of the mortgage inter-
est deduction).
126. Denise DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are Homeowners Better
Citizens?, 45 J. URB. ECON. 354, 355 (1999) ('[B]ecause of the high transaction costs associat-
ed with homeownership, homeowners tend to be considerably less mobile than renters.").
127. See id. at 357; Esteban Rossi-Hansberg et al., Housing Externalities, 118 J. POL. ECON. 485, 528
(2010).
128. See Donald R. Haurin et al., Does Homeownership Affect Child Outcomes?, 30 J. REAL EST.
ECON. 635 (2002) (linking homeownership with improved educational outcomes for chil-
dren).
129. Kim Manturuk et al., Homeownership and Local Voting in Disadvantaged Urban Neighborhoods,
11 CITYSCAPE 213, 216 (2009) (finding, along with "most studies,' that homeowners vote at
higher rates than renters and providing suggestive evidence that the relationship is causal).
As both Brian McCabe and Stephanie Stern ote, increased political participation for home-
owners is a double-edged sword. Voters concerned largely with their housing values have
incentives to make sure local government functions properly, but also have incentives to ex-
clude others, using zoning or other tools. See MCCABE, supra note 125, at 98-119; Stephanie
M. Stem, The Dark Side of Town: The Social Capital Revolution in Residential Property
Law, 99 VA. L. REv. 811, 846-5o (2013).
130. See MCCABE, supra note 125, at 67-97 (examining "how homeowners participate in local
politics, build social capital, and get involved in their communities").
131. Id. at 102-o6.
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ure in a community allows residents to overcome collective action problems to
create public goods, leading to both financial and social benefits for families
and their communities.
Stable populations may also generate greater public or even business in-
vestments in a community. Building a subway or light rail line through a city or
town only makes economic sense if the population that it will serve remains in
the area (or moves to the investment and then stays in place).132 Businesses
that see stable populations face reduced risk when investing in a community,
and this reduction in risk should generally encourage investment.3 3
Beyond generating wealth through increased investment, geographic sta-
bility may support the development of beneficial social values and relation-
ships.134 Stable communities can strengthen intergenerational bonds, with
grandparents living near grandchildren.' Long-term friendships may be more
likely to endure in stable communities than in transient ones.136 In such com-
munities, social capital can more easily develop.
While there are trenchant critiques of these arguments, this Article does not
seek to litigate them."' Whatever the benefits of population stability, they are
already championed by local and state governments - to the point where they
eclipse national interests. State and local governments constantly seek invest-
ments from businesses and want to ensure that their own public investments
are not boondoggles. Homeowners are the biggest players in local politics al-
132. See Gar Alperovitz et al., Anchoring Wealth To Sustain Cities and Population Growth,
4 SOLUTIONS J. 50, 50 (2012) (arguing that U.S. population instability presents a serious
challenge to public investment).
133. Cf MCCABE, supra note 125, at 36 (noting that many in the early twentieth-century business
community saw efforts to promote homeownership as "germane to their interests").
134. See The National Homeownership Strategy: Partners in the American Dream, U.S. DEP'T
HOUSING & URB. DEv. 1-1 (May 2, 1995), http://www.globalurban.org/National
HomeownershipStrategy.pdf [http://perma.cc/5UA7-RBE7] ("Homeownership is a
commitment to strengthening families and good citizenship.").
135. But, as Bob Ellickson points out, mobility can promote the same values: grandparents can
move near grandchildren, or people can choose communities they like. See Ellickson, supra
note 24, at 381, 401-03.
136. See Lorna Fox O'Mahony, Homeownership, Debt, and Default: The Affective Value of Home and
the Challenge of Affordability, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
169, 169 (Nestor M. Davidson & Robin Paul Malloy eds., 2009) ("Homeownership is not
only associated with financial security, but is also strongly associated with personal and fam-
ily security.").
137. See, e.g., McCABE, supra note 125; A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and
Why Home Ownership Is Not Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189 (2009); William M. Rohe
& Mark R. Lindblad, Reexamining the Social Benefits of Homeownership After the Foreclosure
Crisis, in HOMEOWNERSHIP BUILT TO LAST 99 (Eric S. Belsky et al. eds., 2014).
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ready, and by the very logic of the argument in favor of stability, care very
much about others becoming homeowners.' And incumbent politicians likely
prefer an immobile electorate because it means the voters who supported them
remain in place.
This is not to say there are no national-level gains to neighborhood stabil-
ity. Perhaps stable communities spur greater levels of overall business invest-
ment, due to reduced risk. Perhaps, as Naomi Schoenbaum argues, interstate
mobility has doleful distributional consequences inside families, with trailing
spouses bearing a greater deal of the costs associated with moving, since mov-
ing across states often entails a decline in familial support for child-rearing and
reduced social options."' Perhaps local civic participation encouraged by stable
communities serves as a schoolhouse of democracy, making for better citizens
at the national level. 140 And there is some evidence that the act of moving has
negative health and psychological effects for children, particularly if the move
happens between ages twelve and fourteen.14 1
138. Failing to acknowledge this is the central flaw in an otherwise terrific recent book by Brian
McCabe. He argues that most of the alleged benefits of homeownership, such as greater
community involvement, are really a product of residential stability rather than ownership.
The only way homeowners are more active in community life than other long-term residents
is that they vote at higher rates, and this results in exclusionary policies rather than anything
positive. McCabe argues that rather than subsidizing homeownership, federal tax law
should subsidize residential stability directly. MCCABE, supra note 125, at 133-37. While doing
so may be better than subsidizing homeownership, it is not clear why the federal govern-
ment needs to subsidize residential stability at all, given the likelihood that state and local
governments will do it.
139. Schoenbaum, supra note 24, at 1175. It should be noted that these costs do not necessarily
match actual "incidence" inside families, any more than an employer paying a payroll tax ra-
ther than an employee means that the employer bears the economic cost of the tax. To know
how costs are borne among family members, we would need to know a lot more about the
state of negotiating power inside families and how it affects other aspects of interfamilial
negotiation. Schoenbaum also argues that moving creates problems because employees may
not adequately measure the downsides of moving due to cognitive biases. Id. at 1211. Maybe.
But as she notes, cognitive biases might cause existing employees to inaccurately assess the
upsides of moving too, through loss aversion and status quo bias. There is no obvious rea-
son to think either of these cognitive cases is worse without empirical support.
140. This is a major justification for homeownership subsidies. See Stephanie M. Stern, Reas-
sessing the Citizen Virtues of Homeownership, 111 CoLUM. L. REV. 890, 891-93 (2011) (review-
ing and critiquing arguments hat homeownership makes for better citizens).
141. Roger T. Webb et al., Adverse Outcomes to Early Middle Age Linked with Childhood Residential
Mobility, 51 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 291, 293-98 (2016). That said, the study does not
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But these gains are merely speculative, and the national harm of limiting
interstate mobility is grave. The large majority of gains from population stabil-
ity are captured by the communities in which people stay put and not by the
rest of the nation.
II. WHY IS INTERSTATE MOBILITY DIFFICULT? FEDERAL, STATE, AND
LOCAL LAWS AND OUR STICKY INTERNAL LABOR MARKET
Direct limits by states on individuals or capital traveling across state lines
are often unconstitutional under the "right to travel" doctrine or the dormant
Commerce Clause.142 But many constitutional local and state policies neverthe-
less indirectly impede labor and capital mobility.143 These policies have sub-
stantial negative effects on the efficiency of the national economy.
However, for reasons explained in Section I.D, state and local governments
have little incentive to care about these costs and strong incentives to promote
stability. These governments by design represent local interests, often at the
expense of the national interest. Furthermore, local governments are dominat-
ed by pro-stability, anti-mobility stakeholders -in particular, homeowners and
older voters who turn out in low-information local elections. The federal gov-
ernment makes policies that impede mobility as well, often without much in-
put from figures concerned with macroeconomic performance.
This Part is divided into three Sections. Section II.A discusses two primary
tools through which state and local governments limit entry into labor mar-
kets: land-use laws that restrict housing construction and occupational licens-
ing rules that directly bar participation in state labor markets. Section II.A ex-
plains how these laws directly affect the macroeconomic forces discussed in
Part I. Land-use rules that limit access to rich regions reduce agglomeration
142. See Jide Nzelibe, Free Movement: A Federalist Reinterpretation, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 433, 435
(1999) (describing the Supreme Court's "right to travel" and dormant Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence as largely atextual efforts tied to the "idea of conserving the political and eco-
nomic union against provincial state interests").
143. Of course, governments could impede mobility more. Naomi Schoenbaum shows that core
parts of federal employment law "enable geographic mobility by minimizing attachments
between employees and employers'" Schoenbaum, supra note 24, at 1173. Doctrines like at-
will employment reduce the connections between employers and employees, while antidis-
crimination laws and norms increase the availability of jobs. Further, family law's focus on
nuclear families as opposed to broader conceptions of the family unit allows for greater mo-
bility. Id. at 1173-74. If grandparents could veto moving decisions, surely interstate mobility
would be lower still.
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gains and result in lower wages, as suggested by Hsieh and Moretti's work.144
These laws likely also reduce growth rates, as they limit the capture of infor-
mation spillovers. Further, land-use rules create rents for landowners and re-
duce labor income for potential entrants, contributing to wealth and income
inequality. Similar stories can be told about occupational licensing, although
because these limits are usually set at the state level, the effects are less direct.
But the difficulty in transferring licenses across tates makes moving to oppor-
tunity harder, harming the national economy.
Barriers to entry into rich markets also weaken the capacity of the Federal
Reserve to generate monetary policy, or for Congress to use fiscal policy, in a
way that produces full employment and steady prices. Price inflation in
July/August 2016 in Silicon Valley was 3.1% while it was -0.3% in Cleveland-
Akron." 5 There is even more variation in employment between such regions.
In 2010, unemployment rates among the fifty biggest cities ranged from 5% in
Omaha to 25% in Detroit. 146 Even in 2016, a year of low unemployment, rates
of unemployment varied by more than ten percentage points just between
counties in California.147 The existence of such heterogeneity in prices and un-
employment poses a significant obstacle to the Federal Reserve and Congress.
Section II.B discusses the tools through which state and local governments
impose barriers to exit, similarly reducing labor mobility. Conditions on public
144. See generally Hsieh & Moretti, supra note ioo (demonstrating resulting reductions in wages
and overall U.S. growth).
145. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economy at a Glance: San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA, U.S.
DEP'T LAB. (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.ca sanjose-msa.htm [http://
perma.cc/XRC7-BL56]; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economy at a Glance: Cleveland-Elyria,
OH, U.S. DEP'T LAB. (Apr. 4, 2017), http://www.bls.gov/regions/midwest/ohcleveland
-msa.htm [http://perma.cc/7D5A-V2XZ]. General price indexes also can be inaccurate to
the lived experience of different populations because price inflation varies across different
goods in different cities. In rich cities, the prices of goods demanded by the rich (think cavi-
ar on the Upper East Side of Manhattan) are often lower than they are in poorer markets be-
cause there is greater competition among providers (and vice versa). Jessie Hanbury, Are
Poor Cities Cheap for Everyone? Non-Homotheticity and the Cost of Living Across U.S. Cities
(Wharton Sch. Research Paper No. 71, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2516748 [http://
perma.cc/592G-2LFE]. This only adds to the Federal Reserve's difficulties, as inflation must
be measured not only in markets but also among populations in markets.
146. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unemployment Rates for the 5o Largest Cities Annual Average Rank-
ings, Year: 2olo, U.S. DEP'T LAB. (Apr. 15, 2016), http://blsmoni.bls.gov/lau/lacilgio.htm
[http://perma.cc/4TQ7-SA2T].
147. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics Map, U.S. DEP'T LAB. (Jan.
2017), http://data.bls.gov/map/MapToolServlet?survey= la&map= county&seasonal= u
[http://perma.cc/VA9D-VJPH] (showing 23% unemployment rate in Colusa County, CA
and 3.1% in San Mateo County, CA in January 2016).
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pensions, variation in the standards for receiving public benefits, homeowner-
ship subsidies, and general property rules all operate to make leaving harder.
State and local governments often enact these policies for reasons external to
mobility or stability. To the extent these policies have the collateral effect of
limiting mobility, state and local policymakers are often favorable toward in-
creased stability and rarely concerned with the macroeconomic ramifications.
When the federal government and state governments collectively structure
Medicaid benefits so that the unemployed in Detroit will not move to Houston,
we see greater variation in regional unemployment rates. These variations
complicate the task of the Federal Reserve in setting interest rates and of Con-
gress in deciding whether to run deficits.148 When teachers cannot move be-
tween states because their defined-benefit pensions have not vested, or when
homeowners cannot easily sell their homes, we see fewer regions maximizing
agglomeration economies. Together, these exit limits create substantial macroe-
conomic harms.
Section II.C homes in on a set of barriers to exit that particularly afflict de-
clining cities: laws that make it harder to shrink governments and physical
structures to match the current economic condition of cities. State and local
governments in declining regions often seek to maintain their size, hoping for
an economic revival. But when declining cities fail to reduce their housing
stocks or governmental operations, the broader economy suffers. Housing poli-
cies that encourage homeownership and preservation of old buildings cause
workers who might thrive in more functional parts of the economy to stay in
declining areas. By contrast, policies favoring temporary housing and demoli-
tion could weaken people's ties to those areas and encourage mobility. Similar-
ly, when declining cities maintain too-large governments, benefit recipients and
public workers stick around even when there are better opportunities in other
places. Further, because taxes must increase to fund these services, what re-
mains of the private sector in these declining cities suffers, encouraging exit by
key contributors to what is left of the local economy. Taken together, such poli-
cies constitute a systematic bias against mobility -to the detriment of the na-
tional economy.
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148. See supra Section I.A (discussing Optimum Currency Areas and the difficulties for the Fed-
eral Reserve).
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A. Why Is It Hard To Enter?
Land use and occupational licensing make it hard for workers to enter bet-
ter job markets. These two regimes became substantially more restrictive dur-
ing the same period in which interstate mobility fell.
1. Land Use
Of limits on mobility, the best understood in the legal and economic litera-
tures are land-use regulations.149 Before the 1970s, land-use restrictions (zon-
ing laws, subdivision regulations, historic preservation, and so on) limited ac-
cess to some towns or communities, usually rich suburbs.so They did not,
however, cap housing construction in entire metropolitan regions. Builders
could always construct new housing, either in downtowns or on the urban
fringe.
Something dramatic happened to land-use regulation in the 1970s and
1980s: it became much, much stricter."' Importantly, while this phenomenon
affected all types of municipalities -from urban downtowns to inner-ring sub-
urbs to exurbs-it only occurred in particular regions of the country. In par-
ticular, coastal metropolitan regions like San Francisco, New York, and Boston
restricted construction in cities, suburbs, and exurbs.152 Because these popular
149. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 IowA L. REV.
91 (2015) (arguing that land-use restrictions limit housing construction and increase hous-
ing costs in some rich urban and metropolitan areas); see also Vicki Been et al., Urban Land-
Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPi1UcAL LEGAL STUD.
227 (2014) (same); Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why Have Housing Prices Gone Up? 4-9 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11,129, 2005) (same); Edward L. Glaeser et
al., Why Is Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in Housing Prices, 48 J.L. & ECON.
331 (2005) (same); Schleicher, supra note 11, at 1674 (same).
150. See William A. Fischel, The Evolution of Homeownership, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1503, 1515-16
(2010) ("Before the 1970s, it was difficult to discern the impact of zoning on general hous-
ing prices. After the 1970s, regions that had the most restrictive zoning- California and the
Northeast -had the highest prices. This was not just a bubble. The bicoastal housing pre-
mium, which had not prevailed before 1970, became persistent. The new exclusion also
probably encourages metropolitan-area sprawl.").
151. See William A. Fischel, The Rise of the Homevoters: How the Growth Machine Was Sub-
verted by OPEC and Earth Day 3 (Dartmouth Coll. Econ. Dep't Working Paper, 2016) (un-
published manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=28641o9 [http://perma.cc/8X7C-J5GU]
("[I]t appears that land use regulation bec[a]me notably more restrictive during the
1970s.").
152. See Fischel, supra note 15o, at 1515-16 (describing the "bicoastal housing premium"); Glaeser
et al., supra note 149, at 331 (describing the rise in housing costs in Boston, San Francisco,
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regions restricted new housing, demand for living space outpaced supply.
Housing prices soared, but population growth did not.
In contrast to these coastal regions, Southern and Southwestern metropoli-
tan areas like Houston, Phoenix, and Atlanta continued to impose minimal
land-use restrictions." Though demand to live in these regions grew as well,
this demand led to increased housing construction and population, rather than
substantially higher housing prices.154
Because the most restrictive regions tend to be the nation's richest, their le-
thargic population growth has reduced levels of wealth in the United States as
a whole. As previously described, Hsieh and Moretti estimate that GDP would
be 8.9% higher if land-use restrictions were reduced in three restrictive re-
gions: Silicon Valley, San Francisco, and New York.' And once again, because
barriers to mobility reduce the capture of information spillovers, land-use re-
strictions may indirectly impede growth as well.156
Land-use restrictions also contribute to economic inequality. Because these
restrictions raise the cost of housing, they disproportionately prevent poor and
working-class people from taking advantage of high-wage job markets. Hous-
ing costs eat up a larger percentage of a poor person's paycheck than that of a
wealthy person. Thus, even in a city that can provide marginally higher wages,
low-income persons simply may not be able to afford the cost of living in rich,
and particularly Manhattan). One direct way to measure the restrictiveness of zoning and
other regulations is to compare the price of houses with the all-in cost of constructing hous-
es. Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note ioi, at 2. Edward Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko found that,
in 1985, only 6.4% of major metropolitan areas had median prices above 125% of the cost of
building houses, meaning that outside of these areas, there were no real limits on construc-
tion. Id. at 12. In 2013, the median price of houses was between 125% and 200% of construc-
tion costs in 15.4% of major metropolitan markets and more than 200% in three major met-
ropolitan areas: Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Honolulu. Id. at 13-14. For these markets,
this suggests heavy and increasing limits on construction.
153. Glaeser et al., supra note 149, at 359 tbl.4 ; see also Glaeser, supra note 93 (describing reasons
for population inflow into Houston, Atlanta, and Phoenix); Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note
101, at 15 (describing Atlanta as the "canonical example" of a market "in which supply is
highly elastic and demand always is strong enough [to] keep prices" roughly equal to the
cost of constructing a house).
154. There are, of course, regions with low demand. In those regions, land-use restrictions do
not restrict construction, but frequently the size of the existing housing stock limits incen-
tives to build. Glaeser and Gyourko estimate that in thirty-three percent of major metropoli-
tan markets, the median price of a house is less than three quarters of the cost to build a
house, meaning that it is cheaper to buy than it is to build new. Glaeser &
Gyourko, supra note ioi, at 12.
155. Hsieh & Moretti, supra note loo, at 3.
156. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
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land-use-restricted areas. While nominal incomes for janitors in New York are
much higher than in poor states in the Deep South, real incomes, factoring in
housing costs, are lower. As a result, restrictive land-use rules have meant that
poor and middle-class people have little incentive to move to places where
higher incomes are available."' Therefore, these restrictions reduce labor in-
come at the bottom of the income distribution. As Jason Furman, former Chair
of the Council of Economic Advisers, notes, land-use restrictions "can increase
inequality by reducing one of the channels through which workers get a raise,
specifically moving from job to job.""'
This is no small effect. Thomas Piketty famously argued that increasing re-
turns to capital relative to economic growth are a major driver of economic ine-
quality.1s9 But Matthew Rognile and others have found that nearly all of the in-
creased returns to capital in Piketty's work came from housing capital: " [T] he
long-term increase in capital's net share of income in large developed countries
has consisted entirely of housing."160 This is a stark and important finding:
Piketty's result about capital is almost exclusively about real estate. Why? The
most important reason is land-use restrictions. Today's rentiers have something
in common with the classic rentiers of old-they are landowners, but instead of
157. A quick caveat: One of the central papers finding declines in labor mobility finds no differ-
ence in mobility rates between rich and poor. See Molloy et al., Declining Migration, supra
note 5, at 1. The authors interpret this finding to show that land-use restrictions do not
affect mobility rates in the way suggested by Ganong and Shoag. But Ganong and Shoag do
not suggest that land-use rules necessarily change aggregate mobility rates, but rather that
they affect where people move. That is, high-skill people move to rich, restrictive markets,
but lower-skill people move between low-housing-cost states. See Ganong & Shoag, supra
note 12, at 13-14, 28-29. Nothing in Declining Migration contradicts this finding.
158. Jason Furman, Chair, Council of Econ. Advisers, Barriers to Shared Growth: The Case of
Land Use Regulation and Economic Rents, Remarks at the Urban Institute 3 (Nov.
20, 2015), http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20151120
barriersshared growth_1and useregulation and economicrents.pdf [http://perma.cc
/9MH9-5ZYP].
159. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014).
16o. Matthew Rognile, Deciphering the Fall and Rise in the Net Capital Share: Accumulation or Scar-
city?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 2 (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/wp
-content/uploads/2o15/03/1_2015a rognlie.pdf [http://perma.cc/9JR3-D3DS]; see also Alan
J. Auerbach & Kevin Hassett, Capital Taxation in the 21st Century 13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 20,871, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20871.pdf
[http://perma.cc/W8WZ-JV9B] ("[T]he increasing share of capital income in national in-
come reflects an increase in housing's share of capital income."); Gianni La Cava, Housing
Prices, Mortgage Interest Rates and the Rising Share of Capital Income in the United States (Bank
for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 572, 2016), http://www.bis.org/publ/works72.pdf
[http://perma.cc/D9YW-FV9J] (finding rising share of income accruing to land capital and
explaining it as a result of land-use constraints).
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deriving income from owning arable soil that can produce income when
farmed, they own access to valuable labor markets, which increases either their
own income or produces rental income. Today's rentiers then use zoning to en-
sure, and increase through monopolization, the value of their rents.161
These restrictions create income disparities not only between individuals,
but also between states and regions. As discussed above, Ganong and Shoag
have shown that from 1870 to 1970, states' per-capita GDPs were converging.
People would leave poor states like Mississippi to move to richer ones like
Connecticut.16 2 But starting in the 1970s, the combined effect of land-use re-
strictions in many of the richest metropolitan areas stopped that convergence
in its tracks. Though doctors, lawyers, and other high-skilled individuals who
could afford the higher housing costs could still move to capture higher wages
in richer, restrictive states, less-skilled workers could not.163 Notably, although
the GDP gap between richer and poorer states is now static, convergence con-
tinues to this day within the set of states with less-restrictive land-use regula-
tions.16
2. Occupational Licensing
Limiting housing construction is not the only way in which states and lo-
calities prevent people from moving in. Labor regulations, particularly occupa-
tional licensing, also play an important role. While professions like law and
medicine have long required licenses, over the past few decades states have
dramatically increased the number of jobs that require state approval before
practicing.16 s Decades of work by Morris Kleiner and a recent outpouring of
161. See PIKETTY, supra note 159, at 420 ("In other words, we have moved from a society with a
small number of very wealthy rentiers to one with a much larger number of less wealthy
rentiers: a society of petits rentiers if you will."); Ross Douthat, Editorial, Piketty and the
Petits Rentiers, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 25, 2014, 8:05 PM), http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com
/2014/04/25/piketty-and-the-petits-rentiers [http://perma.cc/WN4P-QENT] (noting that
"the petits rentiers" use "how elite cities are zoned" among other policies to "increase its
members' incomes and their estates"); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Con-
trols: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 429, 475-89 (1977) (showing how
suburban neighborhoods, under the right circumstances, can extract monopoly rents).
162. See Ganong & Shoag, supra note 12, at 2 ("For over a century, incomes across states con-
verged at a rate of 1.8% per year.").
163. Id.
164. Id. at 5-6.
165. State laws regulating the practice of professions come in three major flavors: registration
requirements (i.e., requiring parties to publicly disclose their services and potentially pay a
filing fee); right-to-title laws (i.e., rules governing who can call themselves a barber); and
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scholarly interest have documented a massive increase in state licensing re-
quirements.166 Occupational licensing affects a greater percentage of the work-
force than much more frequently discussed facets of labor law, like the mini-
mum wage or private-sector unionization. According to a recent report released
by the White House, "the percentage of the workforce covered by state licens-
ing laws grew from less than five percent in the early 1950s to twenty-five per-
cent by 2008, meaning that the State licensing rate grew roughly five-fold dur-
ing this period."167 These rules proliferated exactly as mobility declined.
About two-thirds of this increase is attributable to changes in state law,
which added licensing requirements for a variety of professions, and the rest is
due to increased participation in regulated industries.168 Occupations that re-
quire licenses in some states now include animal breeder, auctioneer, bartender,
florist, interior designer, turtle farmer, hair braider, and scrap metal recycler,
among many others.16 9
Proponents of licensing requirements argue that such laws increase the
quality of goods and services, protect public safety, and increase consumer
confidence, particularly when there are substantial information asymmetries
between consumers and sellers.170 Others suggest that licenses increase profes-
licensing, which signifies that state approval is necessary before practicing the profes-
sion. See John Blevins, License To Uber: Using Administrative Law To Fix Occupational Licens-
ing, 64 UCLA L. REv. 844, 852-59. This Article focuses on the most onerous of these re-
strictions: licensing requirements.
166. See, e.g., MORRIS M. ILEINER, GUILD-RIDDEN LABOR MARKETS: THE CURIOUS CASE OF OC-
CUPATIONAL LICENSING (2015) [hereinafter KLEINER, GUILD-RIDDEN LABOR MARKETS]; Dick
M. Carpenter II et al., License To Work: A National Study of Burdens from Occupational Licens-
ing, INST. FOR JUST. (May 2012), http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04
/licensetoworki.pdf [http://perma.cc/KV69-Y58G]; Morris M. Kleiner, Border Battles: The
Influence of Occupational Licensing on Interstate Migration, 22 EMP. RES. NEwSL. 4 (2015);
Morris M. Kleiner, Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies, HAMILTON PROJECT (Jan. 2015),
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads-and_1inks/reforming
-occupational-licensing morrisleiner final.pdf [http://perma.cc/V35J-G6G4]; Morris
M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational Licensing on
the Labor Market, 31 J. LAB. ECON. S173-202 (2013).
167. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS & DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS 17 (July 2015) [hereinafter White House Li-
censing Report], http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing
-report-final-nonembargo.pdf [http://perma.cc/L5V9-ICA3E].
168. Id. at 2o.
169. Blevins, supra note 165, at 853; Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational Li-
censing, 39 HARV. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 209, 212, 216-18, 230 (2016).
170. For a summary of the traditional justifications for occupational licensing, see CAROLYN COX
& SUSAN FOSTER, FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OCCUPATIONAL REGU-
LATION 4-16 (1990). See also MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING
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sionalization in a given industry, incentivizing investments in training and
boosting prestige."' But research suggests that such positive effects of licens-
ing requirements remain uncertain at best and are often minimal to nonexist-
ent.172 Of course, there are anecdotal examples of such regulations serving a
useful function. But there is not much evidence that, on average, occupational
licensing requirements provide the benefits that many ascribe to them.
However, such requirements do work effectively as supply constraints,
driving down employment in licensed industries and increasing wages and
prices. Prices in such industries have been estimated to be three percent to six-
teen percent higher than those in unlicensed industries."' On average, em-
ployment growth in licensed industries is lower and wages are higher, although
estimates of the size of the licensing effect vary substantially.174
Restricting competition and increasing wages and prices is in fact the goal
of most licensing regimes. The politics of occupational licensing follow a classic
Olsonian script. Workers in a particular field share a strong interest in estab-
lishing licensing requirements.176 The workers' concentrated interests defeat
the diffuse and disorganized interests of consumers and future entrants.1 7 7
QUALITY OR RESTRICTING COMPETITION? 44-48 (20o6) (explaining why occupations seek to
become regulated and why states attempt to regulate them); Carl Shapiro, Investment, Moral
Hazard, and Occupational Licensing, 53 REv. ECON. STUD. 843, 843 (1986) (applying the
framework of George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970), to occupational licensing).
171. Blevins, supra note 165, at 854; Stephanie Simon, A License To Shampoo: Jobs Needing State
Approval Rise, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBloool424052748
703445904576118030935929752 [http://perma.cc/Z825-FZ3F].
172. IEINER, supra note 170, at 56 (finding that "there is little [evidence] to show that occupa-
tional regulation has a major effect on the quality of service received by consumers or on the
demand for the service other than thorough potential price effects"); see also White House Li-
censing Report, supra note 167, at 13 (noting that "most research does not find that licensing
improves quality or public health and safety").
173. White House Licensing Report, supra note 167, at 4.
174. For studies on employment and wage effects, see White House Licensing Report, supra note
167, at 14; ILEINER, supra note 170, at 65-96; and Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 166, at
S178-91.
175. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (arguing that concentrated minority interests trump diffuse ma-
jority interests).
176. See, e.g, IEINER, GUILD-RIDDEN LABOR MARKETS, supra note 166, at 23 (explaining how
"interior designers have been trying to get on equal footing with engineers and architects by
seeking state-by-state licensing").
177. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 19, at 1o96 (arguing that many state licensing boards "have
abused their power to insulate incumbents from competition"); Larkin, supra note 169, at
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What's more, the administrative bodies that define the "scope of practice" in
many licensing regimes are frequently staffed by representatives of the regulat-
ed industry, further entrenching the concentrated interest's power.1 7 1
What matters most for the purposes of this Article is that licensing re-
quirements limit interstate mobility. Licensing requirements differ across
states. Michigan, for example, requires that licensed security guards undergo
three years of training, while most other states require eleven days or less.17 1
This poses a significant barrier to entry for security guards who might other-
wise consider moving to Michigan. In general, starting one's old profession in a
new state requires costly courses, tests, and training. 0̀ Even when the tests are
the same, states often require different scores to pass, making it difficult to
transfer licenses.8
While multistate licenses and reciprocal agreements are available for a few
industries (like nursing or lawyering), most occupational licensing regimes are
state-specific and thus create substantial barriers to entry for many classes of
workers. 182 Indeed, states vary a great deal even as to which professions require
licenses. More than 1,ioo occupations are regulated in at least one state, but
fewer than sixty jobs are regulated in all fifty states. 18
Numerous studies support the idea that licensing laws limit interstate mo-
bility. Kleiner and Janna Johnson found that licensed professions tend to have
similar within-state mobility rates as compared to non-licensed professions,
but far lower rates of interstate mobility.184 For example, they observed that
"barbers and hairdressers are 27% less likely to move between states but only
7% less likely to move within state than their peers in other [non-licensed] oc-
215 (arguing that " [1]icensing requirements have become vehicles for cronyism at the pub-
lic's expense").
178. See, e.g., Edlin & Haw, supra note 19, at 1103 (finding anecdotal and empirical evidence of
"practitioner dominance" of licensing boards).
179. White House Licensing Report, supra note 167, at 4.
18o. KLEINER, GUILD-RIDDEN LABOR MARKETS, supra note 166, at 32-33.
181. KLEINER, supra note 170, at lo.
182. White House Licensing Report, supra note 167, at 14, 53.
183. Id. at 4.
184. Janna E. Johnson & Morris M. Kleiner, Is Occupational Licensing a Barrier to Interstate Mi-
gration? (2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://paa2o15.princeton.edu/uploads/152473
[http://perma.cc/7XS7-QRWM]. Decades of studies have reached a similar conclusion. See,
e.g., Maya N. Federman et al., The Impact of State Licensing Requirements on Low-Skilled Im-
migrants: The Case of Vietnamese Manicurists, 96 AM. ECON. REv. 237, 237-41 (20o6); Arlene
S. Holen, Effects of Professional Licensing Arrangements on Interstate Mobility and Resource Allo-
cation, 73 J. POL. ECON. 492, 492-98 (1965); B. Peter Pashigian, Occupational Licensing and the
Interstate Mobility of Professionals, 22 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1-4 (1979).
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cupations."' President Obama's White House performed a similar analysis
across a broader range of industries and found that "interstate migration rates
for workers in the most licensed occupations are lower by an amount equal to
nearly 15 percent of the average migration rate compared to those in the least
licensed occupations. But the difference between these workers in within-state
migration is much smaller, only about 3 percent of the average rate."186 This
affects labor mobility by reducing the degree to which workers in regulated in-
dustries can move to metropolitan areas in other states with different licensing
regimes. 117
There has been some positive movement toward reform in this area, and
the push to remove licensing requirements enjoys bipartisan support.' Fol-
lowing a proposal by President Obama, Congress appropriated a small amount
of money to reduce technical difficulties for states that wanted to make occupa-
tional licenses work across borders."' President Obama's Fiscal Year 2016
Budget included $15 million in new discretionary funding for the Department
of Labor to identify, explore, and address areas where licensing requirements
create barriers to labor-market entry or mobility. 10 The Obama White House
even publicized a list of best practices for state governments, which as spurred
some reform."' President Trump's Labor Secretary Alexander Acosta has con-
tinued this push, calling for the elimination of many licensing rules, and sever-
al Republican members of Congress have proposed legislation that would con-
dition protection from antitrust review for licensing regimes on a reduction in
185. Johnson & Kleiner, supra note 184, at 3. The effect is the opposite for nurses, although the
authors did the study during a nationwide nurse shortage. Id.
186. White House Licensing Report, supra note 167, at 15. They also compared licensed workers'
mobility rates to the mobility rates of workers with certification in industries that did not
require licenses to practice. "Over the eight-month period starting in late 2012, licensed
workers were about 20 percent less likely and certified workers in the SIPP were about 60
percent more likely than non-licensed, non-certified workers to change States." Id. at 65.
187. See supra note 4.
188. See IEINER, GUILD-RIDDEN LABOR MARKETS, supra note 166, at 3; Blevins, supra note 165,
at 847, 854.
189. Matthew Yglesias, Obama's War on Excessive Occupational Licensing Highlights His Increasingly
Unfashionable Brand of Liberalism, Vox (June 20, 2016, 9:oo AM), http://www.vox.com
/2016/6/2o/11963748/obama-occupational-licensing [http://perma.cc/Y6N4-47VT].
190. Furman, supra note 158, at 15.
191. White House Licensing Report, supra note 167, at 43; Press Release, White House Office of the
Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: New Steps To Reduce Unnecessary Occupation Licenses That Are
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their scope.192 Further, interest groups have become concerned with the issue.
The Institute for Justice and the Pacific Legal Foundation have challenged the
legality of various occupational licensing regimes with some success."' The
Supreme Court made a minor move against occupational licenses when it held
that, when taken to the extreme, delegation of licensing to professional bodies
could result in the forfeiture of state-action immunity under antitrust laws.194
But these small steps in the right direction have done little to change the un-
derlying problem. A huge part of the labor force remains in industries subject
to occupational licensing, with licensing requirements varying dramatically
from state to state. These occupational licensing rules thus impede the internal
market for labor.
B. Why Is It Hard To Exit? How Federal, State, and Local Laws Make Leaving
Places Difficult
While limits on entry make it harder for people to move to opportunity,
limits on exit make it harder for people to flee depressed economic regions in
192. See Michelle Cottle, The Onerous, Arbitrary, Unaccountable World of Occupational Licensing,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 13, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/o8/trump
-obama-occupational-licensing/536619 [http://perma.cc/5JBJ-UXEX] (describing Secretary
Acosta's criticisms and proposed legislation by Republican members of Congress); Sean
Higgins, Labor Secretary Alexander Acosta Calls for Occupational Licensing Reform, WASH. Ex-
AMINER (July 21, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/labor-secretary-alexander
-acosta-calls-for-occupational-licensing-reform/article/2629390 [http://perma.cc/QF74
-9RAX] (describing Acosta's criticisms of occupational icensing).
193. Blevins, supra note 165, at 854-55; Liberty Blog: Occupational Licensing Laws, PAC. LEGAL
FOUND. (2017), http://blog.pacificlegal.org/category/occupational-licensing [http://
perma.cc/VGT3-8QS2] (describing many Pacific Legal Foundation efforts to challenge oc-
cupational licensing laws in court); Occupational Licensing, INST. FOR JUST. (2017), http://
ij.org/issues/economic-liberty/occupational-licensing [http://perma.cc/J4LH-92JV] (de-
tailing the Institute for Justice's efforts at using litigation). The Supreme Court of Texas re-
cently ruled against a state agency that required eyebrow threading specialists to obtain 750
hours of cosmetology training. Patel v. Tex. Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d
69 (Tex. 2015). The Arizona Legislature also advanced a bill to abolish state licenses for a va-
riety of occupations. Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, Arizona Bill Would Kill Licensing Requirements




194. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (holding that the North Car-
olina Board of Dental Examiners, which prohibited non-dentists from offering teeth whiten-
ing products or services, was a nonsovereign entity controlled by active market participants
that did not receive active supervision by the State, and thus the Board's anticompetitive ac-
tions were not entitled to state-action immunity from federal antitrust law).
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the first place. These two factors work in tandem to keep people in stagnant la-
bor markets, drastically limiting output and increasing inequality.
When a negative economic shock hits a city or region, driving unemploy-
ment up and wages down, people may nevertheless elect to stay for various rea-
sons. Many of those reasons are nonmonetary. We make friends, build social
networks, and raise our families where we live. So even when moving could
lead to employment or higher wages, some people still may choose not to go.
Further, local government by its very nature limits individuals from mov-
ing to the best economic location."' State and local governments provide a
host of public services and legal regimes -from schools to police to gun laws -
that are tied to geographic location. When people move from Detroit to Hou-
ston, they can keep their cell phone plans and Amazon Prime accounts. But
they must take on a whole new set of public goods and legal regimes -
changing schools, gun laws, and so forth. As I have argued elsewhere, this is a
cost of having public goods provided locally, as opposed to federally or by pri-
vate contract untethered from geography.1 96 Of course, local provision of ser-
vices has many benefits, particularly (as Charles Tiebout famously argued) by
improving fit between preferences and policies.'97 But this fit comes at a cost: it
undermines agglomerative efficiency because it forces people to choose their
locations based on packages of government services, rather than solely based
on an economic calculus.98 If parents like their child's school, they will be less
willing to take a new job in a different city - especially when there is no guaran-
tee that a school of similar quality will be available at a similar tax rate.
It is not merely the fact that moving requires breaking social ties, or receiv-
ing different packages of local services, that limits mobility. There are many
specific policies that inhibit exit among certain populations. This Section delin-
eates a few of them.
195. Schleicher, supra note 20, at 1541-45.
196. Id. People can contract into some laws and public services, of course, rendering this conflict
moot. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 1o5 HARv. L. REv. 1435, 1437 (1992) (discussing the
"desirable role of state competition in shaping corporate law").
197. Schleicher, supra note 20, at 1541; Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,
64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
198. See Schleicher, supra note 20, at 1540-45.
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1. PublicEmployees
Almost thirteen percent of Americans work for state and local governments,
and ninety-two percent of them have defined-benefit public pensions."' State
and local government employees often must rely exclusively on these pensions,
as many do not receive Social Security benefits.2 00
"Defined-benefit" plans guarantee benefits for workers who stay in a sys-
tem for a set period of time. Such plans often have long vesting periods, requir-
ing people to stay in a single system for many years. As of 2012, eighteen states
require a teacher to stay in the system for eight or more years before she can ac-
cess her benefits.20 1 In many states, a teacher who leaves before her defined-
benefit plan vests can only withdraw her own contributions, not the contribu-
tions made by her employer; in some states, a teacher who leaves the system
loses most or all of her own contributions as well.202 Thus, in contrast to "de-
fined-contribution" plans, which an employee can take with her when she
leaves her job, defined-benefit plans are often non-portable and thus make
moving difficult. The disincentive to move is huge: Robert Costrell and Mi-
chael Podgursky estimate that "teachers who split a thirty-year career between
two pension plans often lose over half their net pension wealth compared to
teachers who complete a career in a single system."203
199. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 61; Leora Friedberg, Labor Market Aspects of State and
Local Retirement Plans: A Review of Evidence and a Blueprint for Future Research, 10 J. PENSION
ECON. & FIN. 337, 337 n.1 (2011). These percentages come from 2005, but post-Great Reces-
sion reforms have surely lowered the percentage of public employees with defined-benefit
public pensions.
200. Virginia Groark, Noble Change of Careers Can Be Costly, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2002), http://
www.nytimes.com/2002/03/24/nyregion/noble-change-of-careers-can-be-costly.html
[http://perma.cc/RU55-YG6P].
201. KATHRYN M. DOHERTY ET AL., NAT'L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, No ONE BENEFITS:
How TEACHER PENSION SYSTEMS ARE FAILING BOTH TEACHERS AND TAXPAYERS 33 fig.19
(2012), http://www.nctq.org/p/publications/docs/nctq pension paper.pdf [http://perma
.cc/2WPD-7WKTG].
202. Id. at 32.
203. Robert M. Costrell & Michael Podgursky, Distribution of Benefits in Teacher Retirement Sys-
tems and Their Implications for Mobility 40 (Nat'l Ctr. for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in
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Though researchers have found it difficult to calculate the precise magni-
tude of the effect on mobility, it is clear that the prevalence of defined-benefit
pensions with long vesting periods hinders workers' ability to move at will.204
2. Public Benefits
Citizens who receive public benefits risk losing access to those benefits
when they move. Many federal programs allow states to determine eligibility
standards. This flexibility allows states to tailor their programs to their citizens'
needs and preferences, but it also leads to wildly fluctuating standards across
states.205  hen poorer citizens move from high-benefit to low-benefit states,
they can lose access to health care and other poverty relief programs.2 06 This
phenomenon has become even more dramatic since the passage of the Afforda-
ble Care Act, as the differences in eligibility standards have expanded.207 Under
the block-granted TANF program, the standard for eligibility varies by huge
amounts from state to state. A single mother with two children qualifies for
benefits even if earning as much as $1,605 per month in Arkansas, but the same
mother would need to earn less than $859 per month to qualify in New
York.208 Many other nationalized programs have different standards based on
state policies. For example, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program al-
lows states to set an asset limit for individuals who seek to qualify for bene-
fits. 209
Notably, differences in eligibility standards have increased just as the poor
have become less mobile.210 Since the 198os, states repeatedly have been grant-
204. See, e.g., Friedberg, supra note 199, at 348-50.
205. See Lehrer & Sanders, supra note 6, at 23-25 ("Differing state eligibility requirements for
Medicaid and other subsidized health-insurance programs, likewise, mean that some poor
individuals will lose health coverage when they move.").
2o6. See id. at 25 (listing long wait times for Section 8 housing vouchers and eligibility require-
ments for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Programs as factors that produce stickiness).
207. See Carolyn Y. Johnson, The Striking Difference Between States that Expanded Medicaid and the
Ones that Didn't, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/wonk/wp/2o16/o9/13/the-difference-between-states-that-expanded-medicaid-and
-the-ones-that-didnt [http://perma.cc/E56F-LQB8].
208. GENE FALK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43634, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES
(TANF): ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT AMOUNTS IN STATE TANF CASH ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 4
fig.1 (2014), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43634.pdf [http://perma.cc/LV67-J1KG].
209. Asset Limits in Public Benefit Programs, PROSPERITY Now (2016), http://scorecard
.prosperitynow.org/2016/measure/asset-limits-in-public-benefit-programs [http://perma
.cc/4WMK-QCWZ].
210. Again, I am not making a causal claim; rather, I wish to point out that policy is not helping.
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ed greater operational control over the federal welfare state.2 11 In 1981, Con-
gress terminated a huge number of federal programs and replaced them with
block grants to states.212 In 1996, Congress replaced the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children with the TANF program, which uses block grants to ad-
minister traditional welfare funding.2 13 Successive Presidents have issued states
waivers to experiment with the use of Medicaid and other federal programs.2 14
The Supreme Court's decision in NFIB v. Sebelius gave the states greater capaci-
ty to turn down the expansion of Medicaid in the Affordable Care Act,215 and
nearly twenty have done so.2 16
There are good reasons to give states greater ability to determine benefits
levels, but these differing standards hinder or bias interstate mobility in a
number of ways. First, at the simplest level, people who receive benefits are less
likely to move to states where they will no longer be eligible. This will, for in-
stance, impede moves to Texas, due to its generally sparser benefits -and in
spite of its hot job market.2 17 Second, in theory, more generous states may have
less out-migration (and more incoming migrants), meaning there will be a
greater mismatch between the "natural" needs of the labor market and the sup-
ply of labor.2 18 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, even where eligibility
211. David Super has written extensively and perceptively on the matter. See, e.g., David A. Super,
Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375 (2011) ; David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitu-
tion: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541
(2008); Super, supra note 112.
212. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-85-46, BLOCK GRANTS: OVERVIEW OF EXPERI-
ENCES TO DATE AND EMERGING ISSUES, at i (1985) ("The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1981 ushered in a new era of relationships between the federal and state governments.
Gone are many of the federally administered [programs] . . . . In their place are block grants,
which give far more authority to states . . .
213. See Super, supra note 112, at 2584-85.
214. See id. at 2612.
215. 567 U.S. 519, 575-88 (2012).
216. See, e.g., Where the States Stand on Medicaid Expansion, ADVISORY BOARD (May 19, 2017),
http://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/resources/primers/medicaidmap [http://perma.cc
/7YXL-HVDG].
217. Further, if the higher taxes necessary to fund redistributive spending have any negative
effect on employment, benefit differentials should limit more moves than they encour-
age, ceteris paribus.
218. Encouraging moves to generous states also deforms that labor market, but the magnitudes
of the phenomenon are unclear. As Nicholas Bagley notes, the evidence that people moved
to capture greater health benefits following the expansion of Medicaid under the Affordable
Care Act is not strong. Nicholas Bagley, Federalism and the End of Obamacare, 127 YALE
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standards are similar, transfer can be difficult due to administrative require-
ments. These requirements are "dauntingly complex and often adversarial,"
with a "degree of nonuniformity, ambiguity, and opaqueness [that] is astonish-
ing."219 As a result, even formally transferable benefits can create limits on ex-
it.2 2 0 This limits interstate mobility, and thus limits the capacity of residents to
move to out-of-state metropolitan areas.22 1
3. Homeownership
Homeownership, another barrier to exit, is encouraged and subsidized by a
number of federal policies. These include: the mortgage interest deduction,
preferred capital gains tax treatment for housing, mortgage insurance through
the Federal Housing Administration and other agencies, the failure to tax im-
puted rent on owner-occupied housing, secondary market support for mort-
gages through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, direct federal spending, and so
on.222 The magnitude of these subsidies cannot be overstated. The tax benefits
alone constitute $121 billion in lost revenue annually.2 23
219. Thomas E. Simmons, Medicaid as Coverture, 26 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 275, 299-300
(2015).
220. For instance, federal housing vouchers can be used for "an eligible dwelling unit if the dwell-
ing unit to which the family moves is within any area in which a program is being adminis-
tered under this section," which is basically everywhere. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(r)(1) (2012). But
there are very few moves, leading commentators to argue that Section 8 vouchers are not
truly portable. See Sara Aronchick Solow, Racial justice at Home: The Case for Opportunity-
Housing Vouchers, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 481, 503 (2010); Philip D. Tegeler et al., Trans-
forming Section 8: Using Federal Housing Subsidies To Promote Individual Housing Choice and
Desegregation, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 451, 478-79 (1995); see also Carissa G. Climaco et
al., Portability Moves in the Housing Choice Voucher Program, 1998-2oo5, 1o CITYSCAPE 5, 5
(2008) (describing a low rate of portability moves among recipients of vouchers). Why?
The rules make it hard to move. Before continuing to receive benefits in the new location,
participants must use their vouchers in their home market for at least a year. And if users
cannot find a suitable apartment within sixty or ninety days, they risk losing the voucher en-
tirely.
221. See supra note 4.
222. See William G. Gale et al., Encouraging Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 2007 TAx
NOTES 1171. Some of these policies do not actually increase homeownership rates. The mort-
gage interest deduction, for instance, largely serves to increase prices and house size, but not
homeownership rates. See id. at 1171; Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of
the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 17 TAx PoL'Y & ECON. 37 (2003).
223. The Joint Committee on Taxation placed the aggregate cost of the mortgage interest, prop-
erty taxes, and capital gains provisions at $121.3 billion in 2013. Benjamin H. Harris et
al., Tax Subsidies for Asset Development: An Overview and Distributional Analysis, TAX POL'Y
CTR., URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Feb. 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/-
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Some might argue that the supposed public benefits of homeownership
justify tax subsidies this large. In particular, homeownership may create better
citizens, encourage involvement in local affairs, and lead to contributions to
other local public goods or social capital.2 24 But as mentioned earlier, most of
these benefits are felt locally, meaning that state and local governments would
likely subsidize them even if the federal government did not.22 5
And furthermore, these local benefits of homeownership come at the price
of national economic harms. David Blanchflower and Andrew Oswald have
shown that homeownership rates correlate with substantially higher unem-
ployment: "[A] doubling of home-ownership in a state would be associated in
the steady state with more than a doubling of the unemployment rate."2 26 They
also find that homeownership rates result in substantially lower labor mobili-
ty
22 7
The causal explanation for why homeownership rates increase unemploy-
ment is less clear. The most intuitive explanation is that homeownership di-
rectly limits exit. Because owners must sell to move, and selling is costly, one
might think homeowners are less likely to move to new jobs. But this causal
connection is questionable, as homeowners do not appear to have higher un-
employment rates than renters.228
That said, during economic downturns, homeownership might have a par-
ticularly negative effect on exit. Fernando Ferriera, Joseph Gyourko, and Joseph
Tracy find that owners with negative equity face "lock-in" effects.2 2 9 They can-
not move because the revenue from the sale of the home does not cover the
/media/research/files/papers/2o14/o2/tax-subsidies-for-asset-development
/taxsubsidiesforassetdevelopment.pdf [http://perma.cc/FR8Z-ZSBD].
224. See Gale et al., supra note 222, at 1177-78. They might also provide a useful savings vehicle
for ordinary people. Because individuals tend to consume too much and save too little due to
their financial myopia, subsidized housing might encourage people to save. See Harris et
al., supra note 223, at 8. On the other hand, encouraging people to accumulate capital in their
homes also encourages them to maintain heavily under-diversified asset portfolios. This lack
of diversification puts them at substantial risk to fluctuations in the housing market-which,
in turn, encourages them to seek insurance in the form of greater land-use re-
strictions. See WILLiAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 14 (2005).
225. See supra Section I.D (describing local incentives to subsidize population stability).
226. David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, Does High Home-Ownership Impair the Labor
Market? 23 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19079, 2013), http://www
.nber.org/papers/w19079.pdf [http://perma.cc/W47Z-KWT31-
227. Id.
228. Id. at 6.
229. Fernando Ferriera, Joseph Gyourko & Joseph Tracy, Housing Busts and Household Mobility, 68
J. URB. ECON. 34,34 (2010).
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loan balance. Further, these homeowners might be loss-averse. As housing
prices decline, people might be unwilling to take substantial losses on the value
of their home -even if taking a loss would be rational. "Owners suffering from
negative equity are one-third less mobile, and every added $1000 in real annual
mortgage costs lowers mobility by about 12%."230
Blanchflower and Oswald suggest another possibility: homeownership in-
centivizes people to enact restrictive land-use laws, so new firms cannot enter
markets with high homeownership rates.2 31 Zoning restrictions may directly
stop employers who cause local externalities, like factories or tall buildings.
Many scholars, particularly William Fischel, have pointed to homeownership
rates as a causal force behind greater land-use restriction.23 2 Homeowners care
about preserving the value of their largest asset and use zoning to insure it
against the risk associated with new development. A homeowner would vote to
block construction of a waste disposal plant right next to her house, even if it
promised to bring lots of jobs to town. As a result, homeownership may limit
not just exit, but also entry-particularly entry by employers-thus increasing
unemployment.
Yet another possibility is that high homeownership rates create externalities
that apply to both owners and renters.233 Blanchflower and Oswald note that
this could work through a channel of information about he local work force -
low levels of mobility may tell employers something about the qualities of the
local work force - although they note there has not been empirical work testing
this hypothesis.2 34 But it is not hard to tell a story consistent with this idea. For
instance, employers may make less effort to hire from regions with high home-
ownership rates, as they are worried their offers will not result in acceptances
and moves (because they might believe that homeowners are less likely to
move than renters). Homeownership would thus drive down the mobility of
renters, because it would scare employers from even trying to recruit in places
with high homeownership rates.
Whatever the cause, the empirics show that homeownership rates correlate
with unemployment and lower interstate labor mobility. Because federal hous-
230. Id. Other studies, however, have found no evidence of lock-in effects. See, e.g., Robert G.
Valletta, House Lock and Structural Unemployment, LAB. ECON., Dec. 2013, at 86, 86.
231. See Blanchflower & Oswald, supra note 226, at 3, 6.
232. See supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text; see also Gale et al., supra note 222, at 1177
(noting that "homeowners are more likely to support restrictive zoning measures that inflate
prices").
233. See Blanchflower & Oswald, supra note 226, at 6.
234. Id.
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ing policy aims to increase homeownership rates, it reduces interstate churn
and harms the efficiency of the labor market-both substantial costs that poli-
cymakers should take into account.
4. Property Law
Like federal tax policy, state and local real property laws hinder labor mo-
bility. Almost all property in the United States is held in "fee simple absolute,"
the most extensive estate in property, providing ownership of endless duration,
unencumbered by future interests, and with a full set of rights to use, alienate,
or bequeath the property. Fee-simple ownership emerged as a norm when most
of the value of property came from the use of property itself.235 The slow-to-
change common law of property enshrines this default by limiting the devel-
opment of new forms of ownership through the numerus clausus principle.23 6
But the fee simple is just one way, and perhaps no longer the best way, to
structure property ownership. In an urban age, most of a property's value
comes from its proximity to other properties and from the ability to combine
property uses in advantageous ways.23 7 Lee Anne Fennell argues that the domi-
nance of the fee-simple form of ownership makes it harder to assemble proper-
ties because of holdout problems.238 She also notes that the fee-simple form re-
quires people to own property in a specific place.23 9
The fee simple encourages stasis, Fennell argues. When faced with a cross-
country move, for example, a homeowner must decide whether to sell her
house, and whether to buy a new one (making the move more permanent) or
to rent (forgoing the savings and tax advantages of ownership). The realities of
the home-loan market also make ownership less portable. If interest rates rise
235. Lee Anne Fennell, Fee Simple Obsolete, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1457, 1458-59 (2016).
236. Id. at 1509-10. Numerus clausus is a common-law doctrine under which courts "enforce as
property only those interests that conform to a limited number of standard forms," tradi-
tionally for real property the fee simple, the defeasible fee simple, the life estate, and the
leasehold. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law ofProp-
erty: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2000).
237. See generally supra Section I.B (reviewing literature on agglomeration economics).
238. Fennell, supra note 235, at 1461-62; see also Leah Brooks & Byron Lutz, From Today's City to
Tomorrow's City: An Empirical Investigation of Urban Land Assembly, 8 AM. ECON. J. ECON.
POL'Y 69, 69 (2016) (" [I]n the absence of market frictions such as holdouts, the price of
land sold for assembly should not exceed the price of land sold for other uses ... [but] to-
be-assembled land in Los Angeles trades at 15 to 40 percent premium. . .
239. Fennell, supra note 235, at 146o, 1468.
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after someone has taken out a mortgage, homeowners who want to sell will not
be able to keep their lower rate when they seek a new loan to buy.240
To address these concerns, Fennell proposes a different form of ownership:
a "floating fee."241 This new form of property ownership would give owners
shares and use rights in a set of equivalent properties around the country.242
Owners of floating fees would be capable of building equity and receiving tax
benefits, but they would remain mobile, rather than forced to put down
roots.243 A "floating fee" would allow citizens to move to jobs without forgoing
the benefits of ownership.
Whether the "floating fee" is a good idea is not important for the purposes
of this Article. What is important is Fennell's point that deep common-law
rules, and their interaction with institutions like the mortgage market, do not
facilitate a flowing national market for labor and capital. Further, states are un-
likely to adopt the floating fee for the very reasons suggested in this Article: in-
stead of encouraging homeowning, tax-paying citizens to remain within the
state in times of economic downturn, a floating fee rule would allow them to
exit the state just when the state needs them most. States have no reason to care
about mobility and may in fact be inclined to obstruct it.
Common-law property rules are not the only, or even the most important,
real-property institution that limits exit. Some states limit annual increases in
property valuation for tax purposes, but require full revaluation upon sale. This
practice became common after California passed Proposition 13 in 1978.244
Owners therefore have a disincentive to sell, since they cannot transfer the tax
benefit to the next owner. As a result, people stay in their homes longer.245 Real
estate transfer taxes, which vary widely across the United States, are direct
limitations on mobility.24 6 A family that wants to sell its house and move out of
240. See John M. Quigley, Interest Rate Variations, Mortgage Prepayments and Household Mobility,
69 REv. ECON. & STAT. 636, 636 (1987) (noting that increases in interest rates can create
"lock-in" for homeowners with fixed-rate mortgages, as they cannot transfer their mortgage
to a new property).
241. See Fennell, supra note 235, at 1490-91.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See Nada Wasi & Michelle J. White, Property Tax Limitations and Mobility: The Lock-In Effect
of California's Proposition 13, at 1-2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
11108, 2005), http://www.nber.org/papers/willo8 [http://perma.cc/D7GW-GH5S].
245. Id. (showing that Proposition 13 substantially increased average housing tenure, particularly
in markets with large property value increases).
246. See Ellickson, supra note 24, at 382-83 (discussing transfer taxes as direct limitations on mo-
bility and showing that they are much higher in France than they are in the United States);
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Washington State, for instance, will lose a full two percent of the value of its
home in estate transfer taxes.
Rent-control regulations work similarly. A tenant can usually keep her be-
low-market rent for life, but cannot sell access to below-market rent to the next
tenant, nor keep the protection in a new apartment. As a result, moving means
losing access to the stream of value that is having an apartment at below-
market rates. If a person moves, she thus loses the benefit she gets from the
policy and there is no guarantee that her next apartment will have below-
market rent.247
American property law is not unique in this regard, and it is not the worst
offender. My colleague Bob Ellickson has shown clearly that American property
regulation promotes mobility more than French law does.248 But American
property regimes do restrict exit, both through tax policy and the basic struc-
ture of the common law.
C. Why Is It Hard for Cities To Shrink? Law and Limits on Graceful Urban
Decline
As the previous two Sections have shown, laws limit the capacity of people
to move to areas with economic opportunity, and to move away from areas that
are economically stagnant. The laws discussed so far operate directly on people,
constraining their individual mobility. This third Section concerns a different
set of legal limits: laws that operate not on people, but on municipalities. These
laws prevent cities in economic decline from shrinking appropriately. The fail-
ure of cities to shrink inhibits and distorts interstate population movement as
well.
As the work of David Autor and others has shown, cities and regions
suffering extreme economic dislocations do not necessarily see commensurate
degrees of population exit.249 This is in part due to a specific set of exit limits
that reduce and bias mobility from these types of cities. Buildings, roads, and
Real Estate Transfer Taxes, NAT'L CONE. ST. LEGISLATURES (2017), http://www.ncs1
.org/research/fiscal-policy/real-estate-transfer-taxes.aspx [http://perma.cc/6NZ9-6XVY]
(showing that such taxes range from not existing in states like Texas and Utah, and being as
low as o.1% in South Dakota and Kentucky, to being as high as 3% in Delaware and 2.625%
in New York City for high-end properties).
247. See generally Jakob Roland Munch & Michael Svarer, Rent Control and Tenancy Duration, 52
J. URB. ECON. 542 (2002) (reviewing literature on the effects of rent control and evaluating
the effect of a Danish rent-control program on tenancy duration).
248. See Ellickson, supra note 24, at 376-77.
249. See sources cited supra note 8.
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other physical stock of cities tend to be inertial; they remain in place long after
they cease to be of use. Nor do local governments usually reduce in size at the
same rate as local economies. In fact, these governments often expand as eco-
nomic opportunity fades.
When cities are unable to shrink - both physically and governmentally - to
meet changed circumstances, capital and residents remain in declining places.
Laws that make it hard for cities to shrink act as a form of selective exit re-
striction, creating perverse incentives for unemployed and poorer residents to
stay in stagnant job markets. At the same time, as cities increase taxes to fund
services for the growing number of poor residents, well-off and employed resi-
dents will move away. The result is a bias in mobility -encouraging the em-
ployed to leave while encouraging the unemployed to stay.
This phenomenon is best illustrated by a comparison between urban de-
cline and corporate decline. One goal-according to some, the only goal-of
corporate bankruptcy law is to reduce the cost of capital.250 When a firm be-
comes excessively indebted, a collective action problem among its creditors en-
sues; each creditor has incentives to act in ways that reduce the capacity of
creditors as a whole to recover as much as possible.2 51 Bankruptcy law offers an
orderly solution to that problem. Whether a bankruptcy involves writing down
or delaying some debt while allowing the firm to continue operating, as in a
Chapter i reorganization, or whether it involves selling off a company's assets,
as in a Chapter 7 liquidation, the bankruptcy process avoids piecemeal litiga-
tion and allows capital inside an insolvent company to be put to better use. In
other words, bankruptcy takes capital stuck inside an excessively indebted
company and unsticks it. And by offering a way to move capital ex post, bank-
ruptcy reduces risks ex ante, encouraging investment.
By contrast, the capital trapped inside cities is not easily unstuck following
a negative economic shock. Much of a city's physical stock is by its very nature
immobile and long-lasting-a reality often exacerbated by regulations. The
suite of services municipal governments provide are enduring as well, often ex-
panding in the face of negative economic news, sometimes well beyond the ca-
pacity of a city's tax base. After a negative economic shock, welfare could poten-
tially rise if a city's building stock and government shrank to fit its new
conditions. But such an adjustment is tremendously challenging to achieve.
And, as will be discussed below, neither our current municipal bankruptcy re-
133
250. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz,A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy, 91 VA. L. REV. 1199
(2005) (arguing that reducing the cost of capital should be the only goal of bankruptcy law).
251. Id. at 1200-01.
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gime nor current policies for knocking down buildings offer effective solutions
for this adjustment problem.
The problem of urban bloat has plagued cities throughout history. Consid-
er Guy Michaels and Ferdinand Rauch's recent work on differential urban
growth in France and Britain before 1700. Due to differences in the way troops
retreated following the first sack of Rome, Roman garrisons in Britain did not
survive as cities, but many French garrisons did.252 Hundreds of years later,
French cities remained in these former garrison locations, arrayed along Ro-
man road networks. The British population, meanwhile, began concentrating
in coastal locations to take advantage of new shipping technologies. These
coastal towns experienced faster economic growth, while French cities lan-
guished in their original, land-locked locations. By the Middle Ages, Britons
were two and a half times more likely to have access to coastal waters than they
were during Roman times, while the French were no more likely to have such
access than they were more than a thousand years earlier.253 Residents of
French cities stayed in place even when the relevant economic technology made
obvious the benefits of coastal proximity.254
In part, of course, people did not migrate from inland French cities to the
coast because of simple path dependence. But they also stayed because French
cities developed governmental structures that were hard to relocate - for exam-
ple, local bishops tended to be the providers of public goods.255 Because local
public goods were only available in cities built on old garrisons, citizens could
not move to locations more suitable for economic growth. Public policy limited
252. Guy Michaels & Ferdinand Rauch, Resetting the Urban Network: 117-2012, ECON. J. 1
(May 24, 2017), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/lo.iiii/ecoj.12424/epdf [http://perma
.cc/LCV8-MU2Z].
253. Id. at 4.
254. One hesitates before writing too much about the economic impact of changes in shipping
technology. "It wasn't the double-exposure effect of the last half-minute's talk that had
dumbfounded [Dixon] ... ; it was the prospect of reciting the title of the article he'd writ-
ten. It was a perfect title, in that it crystallized the article's niggling mindlessness, its funereal
parade of yawn-enforcing facts, the pseudo-light it threw upon non-problems. Dixon had
read, or begun to read, dozens like it, but his own seemed worse than most in its air of being
convinced of its own usefulness and significance. 'In considering this strangely neglected
topic,' it began. This what neglected topic? This strangely what topic? This strangely ne-
glected what? His thinking all this without having defiled and set fire to the typescript only
made him appear to himself as more of a hypocrite and fool. 'Let's see,' he echoed Welch in a
pretended effort of memory: 'oh yes; The Economic Influence of Developments in Shipbuilding
Techniques, 1450 to 1485."' KINGSLEY AMIs, LUCKY JIM 14-15 (1954).
255. Michaels & Rauch, supra note 252, at 13.
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the capacity of the populace to adapt to economic and technological change by
failing to allow for cities to shrink.
In recent decades, the United States has felt acutely the problem of cities
that are too large. Economic shocks like mechanization, declining transport
costs, and greater trade competition have decimated a number of American cit-
ies built around manufacturing, leaving their building stock and governments
too large for their current economic needs.25 6
On top of these broader economic developments, idiosyncratic shocks have
hit particular U.S. cities. Atlantic City has been pushed into crisis because the
advent of cheap flights made it easier for east coast vacationers to visit Floridian
beaches, and the rise of casinos on Native reservations deprived the city of its
monopoly over legal table games in the region.25 7 The result has been economic
collapse -rusting husks of buildings with unclear uses, huge amounts of un-
used or barely used housing, and a heavily indebted local government attempt-
ing to provide services to a needy and poor population.2 58
Although the causes of these various municipal declines have varied, their
outcomes have been similar: fiscal crisis and an inability to adapt. Increasingly
poor populations are unable to pay enough taxes to maintain local governmen-
tal services. Why don't places like Detroit or Atlantic City simply shrink as they
might have grown, with people leaving, fields of wheat replacing houses, and
government programs diminishing to fit a smaller tax base? The answer lies in
the fact that, for municipalities, shrinking is much harder than growing. Public
policy should seek to free up capital stuck in bloated cities.
1. Too-Large Housing Stocks
Buildings, both residential and commercial, are usually built to outlast their
first users. The private market for housing partially drives the construction of
these enduring edifices. Homebuyers want to be able to sell in the future.
But it is also the case that local and state regulations encourage builders to
construct houses that will not be easily destroyed. Building codes require hous-
256. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text; Glaeser & Ponzetto, supra note 79.
257. Tina Susman, Casinos No Longer Golden for Atlantic City, L.A. TIMES (July 24, 2014), http://
www.atimes.com/nation/la-na-atantic-city-blues-2o14o725-story.html [http://perma.cc
/VU32-ESPS].
258. Nick Paumgarten, The Death and Life of Atlantic City: Zeno's Paradox Down the Shore, NEW
YORKER (Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2ol5/o9/07/the-death-and
-life-of-atlantic-city [http://perma.cc/3Z65-V6C7].
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ing to be built in ways that make it less likely to fall down.25 9 Zoning laws that
limit heights and densities incentivize developers to build long-lasting houses,
because new buyers know they will not be able to tear down and build higher
in the future if there is demand. Local governments also use zoning and other
rules to bar or limit mobile homes.26 0 Such regulations encourage capital to be
spent on more durable housing, raising the costs of abandonment.
The widespread physical durability of homes means that when cities face
negative economic shocks, they are generally left with far more housing than
their populations require. Detroit's population has fallen from 1.85 million at its
peak in 1950 to slightly less than 700,000 today.2 6 1 Unsurprisingly, much of the
contemporary housing stock dates back to the city's golden era. The median
house in Detroit was built in the 1940s, and thirty-three percent of the city's
housing stock was built before 1939.262 The housing stock of Detroit is old and
massive relative to its current population.
An excessive supply of housing reduces the incentives for newly-
unemployed workers to leave dying cities. Moving to another place would
bring with it a higher income. Huge housing stocks in declining cities, howev-
er, mean that rents are lower than residents could find in places with more jobs,
off-setting the income gains.263 Housing prices in Detroit are far lower than
construction costs, while houses in ordinary markets are roughly equal to con-
struction costs (and in restrictive markets, houses cost much more).264
259. That houses do not fall on people's heads or bum around them is a good thing, of course,
and is the goal of building codes. The widely-used model law known as the International
Building Code states: "The purpose of this code is to establish the minimum requirement o
provide a reasonable level of safety, public health and general welfare through structural
strength, means of egress facilities, stability,... and safety to life and property from fire and
other hazards.. .. "INT'L BLDG. CODE S 101.3 (INT'L CODE COUNCIL 2015). The International
Residential Code, used for single-family houses and other small structures, has roughly the
same text. INT'L RESIDENTIAL CODE (INT'L CODE COUNCIL 2015).
26o. See Anika Singh Lemar, The Role of States in Liberalizing Land Use Regulations (2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
261. Christine MacDonald, Detroit Population Rank Is Lowest Since 1850, DETROIT NEwS (May 20,
2016, 12:24 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2o16/o5/19
/detroit-population-rank-lowest-since/84574198 [http://perma.cc/VC4P-AP2P].
262. Courtney Flynn et al., Region's Oldest Homes Primarily Concentrated in Detroit, DRAWING DE-
TROIT (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.drawingdetroit.com/tag/housing-age [http://perma.cc
/A4L9-GE66].
263. See Notowidigdo, supra note 9, at 6-7.
264. Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, Urban Decline and Durable Housing, 113 J. POL.
ECON. 345, 349, 359-60 (2005).
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This effect on mobility is even more dramatic if the places with more op-
portunities for employment also have artificially high rents due to local zoning
restrictions. For example, to experience an increase in real wages when moving
from Detroit to San Francisco, a worker would need to enjoy a huge increase in
nominal wages because housing in San Francisco is very expensive due to local
building restrictions. This stickiness should be particularly strong among
lower-wage workers because, as discussed in Section II.A, housing takes up a
larger proportion of their incomes.265
Further, for declining cities, a too-large housing stock produces all sorts of
social ills. Empty houses can be criminogenic in urban areas and create nui-
sances that drive down property prices in nearby occupied houses.266 Neigh-
borhoods consisting of many empty houses still draw on local resources -
police have to guard them and street lights still need to be lit -but do not con-
tribute much in the way of property tax revenue.267
In theory, shrinking a city's housing stock after a negative economic shock
should create general benefits -by reducing crime, eliminating the need for
costly government services in depopulated areas, and increasing property val-
ues for remaining houses, to name just a few. But cities have found it very diffi-
cult to shrink their housing stock in practice. For instance, Detroit considered
using eminent domain to take properties in certain zones, which would have
allowed the city to allocate its scarce resources to more populated neighbor-
265. And, in fact, we see lower incomes associated with moves to low-income -rather than high-
income - places, when high-income places have restrictive land-use policies. See Ganong &
Shoag, supra note 12, at 3-4.
266. Dawn Jourdan, Shannon Van Zandt & Nicole Adair, Meeting Their Fair Share: A Proposal for
the Creation of Regional Land Banks To Meet the Affordable Housing Needs in the Rural Areas of
Texas, 19 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEv. L. 147, 149 (2010) (discussing the
effect of empty houses on crime and arson). Foreclosed-upon houses also have criminogenic
effects. Jenny Schuerz, Vicki Been & Ingrid Gould Ellen, Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated
Mortgage Foreclosures, 17 J. HOUSING ECON. 306, 308, 317 (2008); Haifeng Zhang & Eric S.
McCord,A Spatial Analysis of the Impact of Housing Foreclosures on Residential Burglary,
54 APPLIED GEOGRAPHY 27, 33 (2014).
267. See Alan Mallach, Laying the Groundwork for Change: Demolition, Urban Strategy and Policy
Reform, BROOKINGS METROPOLITAN POL'Y PROGRAM 12 (Sept. 2012), http://www.brookings
.edu/wp-content/uploads/2ol6/o6/24-land-use-demolition-mallach.pdf [http://perma.cc
/P86E-5TBP] (describing the costs of public services and lost tax revenue from an excessive-
ly large housing stock); Monica Davey, The Odd Challenge for Detroit Planners, N.Y. TIMEs
(Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/o6/us/o6detroit.html [http://perma.cc
/W 5Q6-848J] (describing the public service costs of having a population spread among
many vacant properties).
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hoods.268 But in the face of contentious debates over which neighborhoods
should be closed and distaste for the use of eminent domain, the uproar that
followed the proposal ultimately doomed it.2 6 9
Cities have come up with creative responses to the problem of excessive
housing stocks, but these piecemeal, controversial solutions have been inade-
quate to combat a problem of such magnitude. For instance, many cities have
developed "land banks" to acquire vacant and tax-foreclosed properties, clear
their title and tax delinquencies, and then lease or sell them in ways that fit lo-
cal purposes.20 This can, and frequently does, involve taking foreclosed resi-
dential properties and converting them into low-intensity uses like tree farms,
or giving them away to neighbors to use as larger backyards.2 7 1 Many cities
have started demolishing vacant houses- io,ooo in Detroit, 3,000 in Buffalo,
2,500 in Cleveland.2 72 But the cost of knocking down vacant and underused
housing is high, due both to physical constraints and federal regulations on
268. Associated Press, Detroit Wants To Save Itself by Shrinking, NBC NEWS (Mar. 8, 2010),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/35767727/ns/us-news-life/t/detroit-wants-save
-itselfshrinking.WAEwojLMyA [http://perma.cc/UMC7-2N3R].
269. Jonathan Oosting, Mayor Dave Bing Seeks Input on Plan To Rightsize Detroit- Without Emi-
nent Domain, MLIvE (Aug. 7, 2010, 2:46 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit
/index.ssf/2o1o/o8/detroit mayor dave bing sets-f.html [http://perma.cc/34VR-F2XS]
(announcing Detroit city leaders' rejection of the use of eminent domain to shrink the city in
the face of public backlash). The most interesting and thoroughgoing effort to shrink a city
has been conducted in Youngstown, Ohio, which focused resources on a few successful
neighborhoods and actively encouraged former residential neighborhoods to transition to
lower-intensity uses like tree farms. See Alexia FernAndez Campbell, The City That Embraced
Its Decline, ATLANTIC (July 7, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2ol6
/07/the-city-that-tried-to-stop-growing/490313 [http://perma.cc/3RU8-H3PF] (interview-
ing the director of the Youngstown Neighborhood Development Corporation).
270. See Frequently Asked Questions on Land Banking, CTR. FOR COMMUNITY PRO-
GRESS, http://www.communityprogress.net/land-banking-faq-pages-449.php [ ttp://
perma.cc/D8JF-DC77] (describing how land banks obtain vacant or tax-delinquent proper-
ty and then " [n]egotiate sales based not only on the highest bid but also on the outcome
that most closely aligns with community needs, such as workforce housing, a grocery store,
or expanded recreational space").
271. See Kellen Zale, The Government's Right To Destroy, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 269, 297-99 (2015) (de-
scribing government efforts to raze property through land banks and redevelopment agen-
cies); Lynn Horsely, Land Bank: Seeking Productive Uses for Countless "Ugly Duckling" Proper-
ties, KAN. CITY STAR (Sept. 18, 2015, 1:52 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics
-govemment/article35716974.html [http://perma.cc/XQA6-QVNT] (describing plans to al-
low poplar trees to grow on land bank owned properties).
272. See Zale, supra note 271, at 270-71.
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displacement and environmental harm.2 73 Some state laws impose additional
regulatory hurdles, resulting in huge disparities in how much it costs to knock
down a house -from around $7,500 in Cleveland to $19,ooo in Buffalo.2 7 4 And
the act of government seizure and potential destruction of property is neces-
sarily controversial, especially because of the political difficulties inherent in de-
ciding which vacant houses and neighborhoods to demolish.
The basic problem therefore remains. Buildings stay up for long periods of
time, for reasons both "natural" and policy-driven. As a result, cities find them-
selves with excessively large housing stocks after economic crashes, and the
populations of these cities remain correspondingly too big. If housing was less
durable, it would also presumably be less costly to produce ex ante. And if local
governments permitted more mobile homes or just cheaper housing, the capi-
tal invested in housing could move to other sectors. Furthermore, if ex post
policies existed to easily knock houses down, housing stocks could be reduced
more easily. Defeating the problem of bloated housing stocks in declining cities
will not be easy, but it is crucial for promoting a mobile labor force.
2. Too-Large City Government
A related problem emerges with respect to city budgets after economic cri-
ses. When a city faces a negative economic shock, its tax revenue falls. Howev-
er, the local government does not automatically shrink in response - contracts
signed, debt issued, and programs established remain in place. Further, nega-
tive shocks result in increased demand for local services. Local redistributive
services are needed more in times of economic dislocation. And when the pri-
vate sector worldorce diminishes, public aid recipients and public workers - all
of whom have an interest in expanding government services - gain political in-
fluence.2 75
In theory, cities should save for downturns. However, as Brian Galle and
Kirk Stark have demonstrated, municipalities wildly undersupport rainy day
273. Mallach, supra note 267, at 5 (describing regulations on demolition that result in huge dis-
parities in the cost of demolishing a house); Noel King, Baltimore Residents Hit Roadblocks In
Efforts To Combat Urban Blight, NPR (Aug. io, 2016, 4:28 PM), http://www.npr.org/2o16
/08/10/489512787/baltimore-residents-hit-roadblocks-in-efforts-to-combat-urban-blight
[http://perma.cc/S8J8-2KGU] (discussing the excessive length of time it took Baltimore to
knock down a block of housing, due in part to restrictions on the use of federal funding for
displacement efforts under the Uniform Relocation Act).
274. Mallach, supra note 267, at 4.
275. Cf infra notes 280-81 and accompanying text (discussing the power of Detroit pensioners
following economic decline).
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funds during boom periods.2 76 This is in part a problem of moral hazard: cities
may expect federal or state aid should an emergency arise. Voters are also bi-
ased toward present consumption because if the debt gets too big, they can al-
ways leave to avoid paying the necessary taxes (unless the taxes are on real
property that they own). 277
a. Too-Large City Governments and Their Perverse Mobility Incentives
Shrinking local government in response to a crashing local economy is a
difficult task. As will be discussed below, though the federal law of municipal
bankruptcy provides some limited tools for addressing debt burdens, it has
significant limitations. State-level reforms are possible and frequently em-
ployed, but often fail to cure the long-run mismatch between local ability to
pay and the cost of services in declining cities. As a result, declining cities end
up with governments that are too large for them to fund on an ongoing basis.
But unlike excessively large housing stocks, the direct effect of this problem
on mobility is mixed. When government services do not decline in proportion
to a city's diminishing fiscal capacity to provide them, it might artificially limit
mobility, particularly among the poor. Under this line of reasoning, unem-
ployed people will remain in dying American cities in part because these cities
continue to provide public goods and services. But the tax increases needed to
fund these services can in turn lead to an exodus of employed workers from the
dying city.2 78 Such an exodus would technically increase labor mobility, but not
the socially useful form of mobility this Article has praised. Driving employed
workers out of dying cities does not balance out unemployment rates around
276. Brian Galle & Kirk J. Stark, Beyond Bailouts: Federal Tools for Preventing State Budget Crises,
87 IND. L.J. 599, 601-02 (2012). The failure to save creates macroeconomic problems other
than the ones discussed here. Particularly, it forces states and cities to cut spending and raise
taxes during downturns, exacerbating recessions.
277. Galle and Stark offer a number of interesting policy suggestions for making states and cities
more likely to invest in rainy day funds. Id. at 619-34.
278. The content of local taxes will affect the extent of exit as well as the amount. If tax increases
are focused largely on property, as local taxes generally are, the effect on exit is muted a bit,
as property taxes are largely "capitalized" into the value of a house. That is, property tax in-
creases reduce the value of residents' houses without changing their other incentives all that
much. (In theory, all types of local taxes are capitalized into property values, but property
taxes run with the land and apply regardless of the owner-occupier's other behavior, and so
are more directly and fully capitalized.) If property taxes go up, property values go down
and homeowners are poorer, but they cannot avoid this effect by selling and moving, thus
reducing the effect of the tax on exit. For a comprehensive version of this argument, see Bry-
an Caplan, Standing Tiebout on His Head: Tax Capitalization and the Monopoly Power of Local
Governments, 1o8 PUB. CHOICE 101 (2001).
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the country, does not promote agglomeration economies, and makes funding
redistributive services harder, not easier.279
In declining cities, the difficulties of reducing government services worsen
over time. As private-sector workers leave, particular populations-net recipi-
ents of public services, public sector workers, pensioners -become more pow-
erful in local politics, giving them power to prevent reductions in benefits.
Consider Detroit, where the political power of pensioners increased during an
economic decline. Despite a spiraling economy, active and retired public work-
ers demanded and received " 13' checks," or non-contractually-owed, undis-
closed bonuses.280 These checks cost the city nearly $2 billion from the 198os
through the 2000s.2 8 1 The city provided for pensioners in need, even though
doing so was not prudent fiscal management.
State and federal responses to cities in crisis are detrimental to mobility as
well, in large part because they confer benefits on geographic locations rather
than on individuals. When cities face fiscal crises, states or the federal govern-
ment may respond by providing substantial bailouts. Bailouts attempt to ad-
dress the immediate fiscal challenges of cities and reinvigorate local economies.
For instance, the federal government provided huge financial benefits to New
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. While providing support to the city of New
Orleans was a standard form of government aid, it is important to understand
that the federal government declined to exercise an alternative course of action:
simply cutting each New Orleans resident a check.282
Bailouts have obvious short-term benefits and provide needed services to
people living in poor places.283 Some people will never move and need services
279. This is almost definitional. If workers are driven out by higher taxes, it means they wanted
to stay absent tax increases. Thus, there is no reason to believe that doing so will promote
agglomeration.
28o. Dustin Block, 13 Things To Know About Detroit's '13th Checks' for Pensioners, MLIVE (Oct.
3, 2013, 7:20 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2013/lo/lothings-to
know-about detroi.html [http://perma.cc/H66A-W44U].
281. Mary Williams Walsh, Detroit Spent Billions Extra on Pensions, N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 25, 2013,
3:08 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/o9/25/undisclosed-payments-cost-detroit
-pension-plan-billions [http://perma.cc/YK2S-JWV6].
282. See Edward L. Glaeser, Should the Government Rebuild New Orleans, or Just Give Residents
Checks?, 2 ECONOMIST'S VOICE 1, 5-6 (2005) (arguing that federal aid to New Orleans should
encourage exit); Michael Grunwald, The Threatening Storm, TIME (Aug. 2, 2007), http://
content.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/o,28804,1646611_1646683_1648904,oo.html
[http://perma.cc/6RYS-ZUAZ] (describing spending and waste in post-Katrina New Orle-
ans).
283. Further, as my great colleague Zach Liscow notes, bailouts may also respond to the tax dis-
advantage that local governments with poor residents and fixed obligations (like paying for
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and jobs. But targeting places rather than people has substantial downsides as
well.284 First, paying for these subsidies requires taxing people in places that
schools) bear. Zachary D. Liscow, The Efficiency of Equity in Local Government Finance, 92
N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2017). To the extent that this is what bailouts do -correct for
bad state tax policy-they are far more attractive, although incomplete in that they are rarely
targeted at all of the jurisdictions suffering from unfair state taxes, or even those that suffer
the most.
284. This is not to say that place-based policies are necessarily less efficient mechanisms for redis-
tribution than more general efforts in the short run. Matias Busso et al. provide the most op-
timistic take in the literature on targeted place-based redistributive policies, finding that fed-
erally-created "empowerment zones," which provided tax incentives and block grants in
certain economically struggling areas, increased local wages without driving up local costs
substantially, with deadweight loss (other than that associated with raising the funds) esti-
mated between thirteen and forty-eight percent of federal spending. Matias Busso et
al., Assessing the Incidence and Efficiency of a Prominent Place Based Policy, 103 AM. ECON.
REV. 897, 897-99 (2013). That is, the redistributive policies functioned relatively effectively
without encouraging populations that were not targeted to move in and claim those bene-
fits. They find that the particular structure of the program and characteristics of the local
housing markets involved meant that the money flowed largely to local workers, not land-
lords, although they posit that the local cost of living may increase in the future. Id. at 930-
31. The rest of the literature on empowerment zones arrives at widely divergent conclusions
regarding their effects. Compare David Neumark & Jed Kolko, Do Enterprise Zones Create
jobs? Evidence from California's Enterprise Zone Program, 68 J. URB. ECON. 1 (2010) (finding
that California's enterprise zone incentives were ineffective), with John C. Ham et
al., Government Programs Can Improve Local Labor Markets: Evidence from State Enterprise
Zones, Federal Empowerment Zones, and Federal Enterprise Community, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 779
(2011) (finding that empowerment and enterprise zones have a positive, significant impact
on labor markets).
More importantly these studies do not show evidence of lasting gains from reasonably-
sized locational subsidies. Rather, they reveal that place-based policies can, under certain cir-
cumstances, target poor people without the benefits being captured by landlords or new en-
trants in the short run. In theory, for a policy to achieve lasting gains, it needs to generate
self-sustaining agglomeration-based conomic growth, only possible perhaps following a
"big push," or a very large local investment. The empirical literature is replete with skepti-
cism of even big pushes, as there are strong forces driving mean reversion to whatever the
long-run trend of local economic activity is. See David R. Davis & David E. Weinstein, Bones,
Bombs and Break Points: The Geography of Economic Activity, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1269, 1282-83
(2002) (finding that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had no effect on
long-run population trends in these cities); Patrick Kline & Enrico Moretti, People, Places and
Public Policy: Some Simple Welfare Economics of Local Economic Development Policy, 6 ANN.
REv. ECON. 629, 65o (2014) (reviewing literature). Further, even if "big pushes" succeed,
they can cause losses elsewhere. The best recent study finds that the biggest push in Ameri-
can history, the Tennessee Valley Authority, did have a lasting positive effect-with respect
to manufacturing at least -but that the agglomeration gains it caused were cancelled out en-
tirely by losses in others. Patrick Kline & Enrico Moretti, Local Economic Development, Ag-
glomeration Economies, and the Big Push: 1oo Years of Evidence from the Tennessee Valley Authori-
ty, 129 Q.J. ECON. 275 (2014) (finding the Tennessee Valley Authority created lasting gains in
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are economically vibrant.285 Second, the benefits may accrue to landowners
(who are less likely to be truly needy) rather than residents, as owners can in-
crease rents following the announcement of a bailout policy. Finally, taking a
longer-term perspective, unless place-based subsidies fundamentally alter the
structure of local economies, they ultimately encourage people to stay in declin-
ing places.286 It is not clear why the country as a whole or a state in particular
should want residents to remain in, say, Atlantic City rather than move to the
New York City suburbs, which would give them access to a better labor mar-
ket.
28 7
From a cynical perspective, subsidies to declining regions sometimes can
appear to be policies designed to serve the interests of rich areas -as efforts to
keep the riffraff out -rather than genuine efforts to reduce poverty. Consider
Michelle Wilde Anderson's argument in favor of continuing subsidy programs
for rural Oregon.288 For many years, local governments in rural Oregon bene-
fited from a share of revenues from logging on federal land in their jurisdiction.
Logging revenues, however, declined sharply in the 198os and 199os. The fed-
eral government agreed to keep sending funds to local governments in place of
the defunct logging revenues.28 9 But there is pressure in Congress to take these
manufacturing employment and local incomes, but that the "indirect" or agglomeration
gains from the government spending were offset by losses elsewhere in the country).
285. Further, progressive income tax rates disproportionally target places that are more produc-
tive. Moving to a high-income city increases labor income, but this gain is reduced by pro-
gressive income taxes. As David Albouy has shown, federal income taxes reduce employ-
ment in high-nominal wage areas by thirteen percent and decrease housing values by five
percent. David Albouy, The Unequal Geographic Burden of Federal Taxation, 117 J. POL.
ECON. 635, 635, 637 (2009).
286. But, ironically, if place-based policies do not inspire entry or reduce exit, they become more
efficient mechanisms for edistribution, as the gains to recipients are not traded off against
deadweight losses due to inefficient moves. Patrick Kline, Place Based Policies, Heterogeneity,
and Agglomeration, loo AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 383, 385-86 (2010).
287. Place-based policies may help alleviate an inefficient lack of job posting in low productivity
places, and subsidies that take the form of local hiring bonuses can, in theory, produce sub-
stantial welfare improvements. See Patrick Kline & Enrico Moretti, Place-Based Policies with
Unemployment, 103 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERs & PROC. 238, 239, 242 (2013) (finding that, de-
pending on local productivity levels, place-based hiring subsidies may offset high hiring
costs that result in too few job postings).
288. Michelle W. Anderson, The Western, Rural Rustbelt: Learning from Local Fiscal Crisis in Ore-
gon, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 465 (2014).
289. Id. at 470-78; see also Madelyn Beck, Senators Seek Reinstated Federal Funding for Rural Coun-
ties, IDAHO MOUNTAIN ExPREss (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.mtexpress.com/news/blaine
county/senators-seek-reinstated-federal-funding-for-rural-counties/article-aSel8e2c
-8692-11e6-87fa-d7a139454dbe.html [http://perma.cc/92VA-AJZM] (noting that the Secure
Rural Schools Act has not been reauthorized this year).
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communities "off the federal dole," and the amounts paid have started to de-
cline. If this funding dries up, local services will collapse. Even so, local voters
have refused to approve tax increases to pay for needed services, keeping rates
lower than those paid elsewhere in Oregon. Anderson argues that state taxpay-
ers should subsidize the maintenance of minimum service levels in rural Ore-
gon even if rural voters refuse to raise their own taxes to fund them as best they
can, and even if few people want to move to these communities.29 0 Why?
"[T]he restoration and continued population of our historic places, whether
urban or rural, is a policy imperative for both environmental and humanitarian
reasons."291 She continues:
In my view, historic places and modes of living have existence value,
even when they have trouble attracting residents and businesses in a
competitive system . . .. [P1erhaps there is existence value to rural liv-
ing, just as there is existence value to the forest ecosystems them-
selves - humankind made spiritually and morally more whole through
the existence of households and environments beyond the hustle bustle
of urban materialism. Perhaps we are made more whole not only by
preserving ecological diversity but also by preserving knowledge-
everything from animal husbandry to the DIY of home goods to sur-
vivalism.292
Anderson seems to acknowledge that aid to poor places is often proposed
for purposes entirely unrelated to alleviating poverty.293 In fact, her argument
290. To be fair, Anderson argues that such bailouts should be conditioned on the localities agree-
ing to raise taxes to state average levels at some point. Anderson, supra note 288, at 498-99.
291. Id. at 494. Anderson also raises the possibility that depopulation will make it easier for land
to be used for drug cultivation. Id. at 5oo. This is a curious argument. Even if small towns
remain in rural Oregon, most land in rural areas is unlikely to have people on it, leaving
plenty of space for drug cultivation.
292. Id. at 499-500 (emphasis omitted).
293. Also, it is unlikely that policies aimed at preserving rural "ways of life" would actually do so.
Lior Strahelivirz has demonstrated that historic preservation policies do not generally pre-
serve or represent history as it was lived. Instead, they determine what was valuable about a
previous era -that is, they reflect today's majoritarian tastes about the past, not "history" in
any meaningful sense. Lior Strahelivitz, Historic Preservation and Its Even Less Authentic Alter-
native, in BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME: EVIDENCE AND INNOVATION IN HOUSING LAW AND
POLICY 108 (Lee Anne Fennell & Benjamin J. Keys eds., 2017). Unlike owls in nature pre-
serves, people in economically-declining areas have access to information about governmen-
tal decisions and can change their behavior in order to capture the subsidies designed by
others. As a result, in the medium term, policies aimed at preserving the "existence value" of
rural communities are likely to protect ways of life that flatter urban and suburban tastes ra-
ther than preserving anything authentically rural. Id. at 120. The seeds of this problem are
144
127:78 2017
STUCK! THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF RESIDENTIAL STAGNATION
that permanent subsidies will allow residents of rural Oregon to stay in place
and remain adorable repositories of homespun knowledge is premised on the
idea that they are unlikely to prosper economically. (Were they to prosper, it is
hard to see why residents would need to make their own home goods!) In
effect, she argues that Oregon taxpayers should incentivize families to remain
in low-wage areas that are not supportive of human capital development (for
adults or, more importantly, for children) because their maintenance of "histor-
ic modes of living" is something the rest of us value.
In many cases, the need for bailouts to economically declining places is
both intense and compelling. Permanent subsidies, however, without any effort
to encourage mobility away from dying places - or to credibly generate sustain-
able economic growth in the targeted area-are counterproductive. Though
often motivated by noble instincts, they most likely reduce rather than increase
opportunity among the poor, while harming the broader economy.
b. Too-Large City Governments and the Incomplete Solution of Chapter 9
Municipal Bankruptcy
A city facing an economic crisis that fails to reduce the size of its govern-
ment will frequently face a debt crisis - a shrinking tax base and growing ex-
penditures are only sustainable for so long. Federal law provides tools for ad-
dressing excessive local indebtedness, most notably Chapter 9 municipal
bankruptcy.29 4 But Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy is an imperfect tool and
could be improved to better promote interstate mobility.
When authorized by the state and after making good-faith efforts to nego-
tiate with creditors, insolvent local governments can file for bankruptcy under
Chapter 9. If a court finds that a municipality is eligible for Chapter 9 protec-
tion, it is granted a stay that bars efforts by creditors to recover debts and is al-
lowed to develop a sustainable plan to adjust those debts. These efforts are
backed by the court's power to approve the writing down of some debt, with-
present in Anderson's description of rural areas - timber communities free from "hustle bus-
tle" or materialism sounds more like an urbanite's fantasy of rural life than an accurate de-
scription of communities as they are.
294. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012). State governmental interventions are far more frequent than Chapter
9 bankruptcies. Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Prob-
lem, 27 YALEJ. ON REG. 351, 360-61 (2010) (describing Chapter 9 as "used by tiny municipal-
ities under peculiar circumstances"). The dynamics of state interventions are quite varied
and very different from those discussed here.
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out creditor approval if necessary.295 Further, Chapter 9 allows local govern-
ments to renege on collectively bargained contracts and encompasses all forms
of indebtedness, including pension obligations that are protected specifically in
state constitutions.296
Municipalities have not traditionally turned to Chapter 9 for relief. Be-
tween 1976 and 2009, there were only about forty filings by general-purpose
municipalities.297 And most of those cases involved sudden financial shocks,
like a major tort claim against a small municipality.298 Instead, most cities fac-
ing real crises have turned to state bailouts or other types of state interven-
tion.299 Only in recent years have we seen bigger local governments with ongo-
ing problems resort to Chapter 9, with the filings of Detroit, Alabama's
Jefferson County, and several California municipalities.0 0
The reluctance to use Chapter 9 to address systemic problems partially re-
sults from the law's structure.' Much of the content of Chapter 9 is borrowed
from Chapter 11 corporate reorganizations.3 02 But, in order to avoid constitu-
tional challenges,0 3 Chapter 9 places substantial limits on the power of bank-
ruptcy courts to order policy changes. Section 903 of the Bankruptcy Code
states that "this chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to control,
by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise of
295. For a discussion of municipal bankruptcy and its historical roots, see Michael W. McConnell
& Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy,
6o U. CHI. L. REV. 425 (1993).
296. See, e.g., In re City of Stockton, 526 B.R. 35 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015).
297. Kimhi, supra note 294, at 359.
298. Id. at 360. That said, there were some large municipalities that almost did so. New York City
famously almost filed in 1975 before the local teacher's union agreed to buy a set of bonds
that kept the city afloat. Jeff Nussbaum, The Night New York Saved Itself from Bankruptcy,
NEW YoRxER (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-night
-new-york-saved-itself-from-bankruptcy [http://perma.cc/BP9B-DAG6]. Bridgeport,
Connecticut attempted to file, but was deemed not to be insolvent. In re City of Bridgeport,
129 B.R. 332 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).
299. Kimhi, supra note 294, at 360 n.47.
300. Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in Municipal
Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150, 1152 (2016).
301. Kimhi, supra note 294, at 354 (arguing that municipal bankruptcy neither improves returns
for creditors nor addresses the root causes of municipal economic decline).
302. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012); Kimhi, supra note 294, at 355-56.
303. See Kimhi, supra note 294, at 356 (arguing that Sections 903 and 904 are the products of
concerns about the constitutionality of Chapter 9 as a whole); McConnell & Pick-
er, supra note 295, at 428, 457 (same).
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the political or governmental powers of such municipality, including expendi-
tures for such exercise."304 Section 904 states:
"Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor consents or
the plan so provides, the court may not, by any stay, order, or decree, in
the case or otherwise, interfere with (1) any of the political or govern-
mental powers of the debtor; (2) any of the property or revenues of the
debtor; or (3) the debtor's use or enjoyment of any income-producing
property."sOs
Chapter 9 is reasonably effective for restructuring and resurrecting munici-
palities in the types of cases for which it was traditionally used- cities facing
huge debts due to certain one-time problems, such as a huge tort judgment or
a theft by the city treasurer. That is, where Chapter 9 is used to achieve the
municipal equivalent of a corporate reorganization, it works well enough ac-
cording to its terms. But Sections 903 and 904 prevent courts from using
Chapter 9 to alleviate a city's larger structural problems, particularly where lo-
cal politics make it difficult for government to shrink. The ordinary reading of
the statute does not allow courts to order localities to raise revenues, sell prop-
erty, reduce spending, or change their operations in any way, limiting courts'
capacity to radically reform local governments to bring them into line with
changed local conditions.
Scholars and judges have gotten quite creative in attempting to fix Chapter
9. Randall Picker and Michael McConnell argue that Chapter 9 gives courts
discretion to force cities to raise taxes and cut spending, notwithstanding the
limitations of Sections 903 and 904.306 Specifically, they argue that the stand-
ard for insolvency for access to bankruptcy could be interpreted to force cities
to make an effort to pay debts through spending cuts and tax increases. Courts
could also find that city-proposed debt adjustment plans that do not institute
reforms are not in the "best interests of the creditors" or are not "fair," "reason-
able," and "equitable."07 Clayton Gillette and David Skeel argue that judges
should use these same tools to require local governments to change their gov-
erning structures, pushing reforms like at-large districts for city councils or re-
ducing the number of city departments.0 s However, as Gillette and Skeel ad-
mit, the constitutionality of such aggressive actions by courts under Chapter 9
304. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012).
305. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012).
306. McConnell & Picker, supra note 295, at 472-81.
307. Id. at 474.
308. Gillette & Skeel, supra note 30o, at 1155-
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is unclear.'09 The use of judicial discretion to push cities to cut spending or re-
form their governing structure remains somewhat at odds with the spirit of
Sections 903 and 904. But it may be permissible under the letter of the statute
and normatively attractive, insofar as it would give courts tools to push cities to
shrink and adapt o their current conditions.
Further, to make Chapter 9 effective in the context of shrinking cities,
courts have already had to rethink the concept of insolvency. Under the statute,
a city is only insolvent if it meets one of two criteria: either it is "generally not
paying its debts as they become due" or it will be "unable to pay its debts as
they become due" in the future.1 o In a strict sense, most debt-ridden cities do
not satisfy this definition-they could pay their bills today if they sold off all
their assets, including land and buildings. Such a fire sale, however, would be
disastrous for residents and harmful in the long run. In response to this di-
lemma, the courts in the Detroit and Stockton bankruptcies created a new con-
cept, which they termed "service delivery insolvency." The courts held that a
situation in which services are so bad that they simply cannot be further cut to
pay bills as they come due meets the statutory definition of insolvency.' This
implicitly lowers the standard for insolvency, as it suggests a limit on what cit-
ies need to cut before the court determines that they are unable to pay their
debts.312
The legacy costs of both debt and government size distort migration pat-
terns. Courts applying Chapter 9 should consider the effect of their decisions
not only on a particular city but also on the national economy."' Judicial inno-
309. Id. at 1208-16.
310. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (2012) ("The term 'insolvent' means ... with reference to a munici-
pality, financial condition such that the municipality is (i) generally not paying its debts as
they become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute; or (ii) unable to
pay its debts as they become due.').
311. In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 781 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) ("' [S]ervice delivery insol-
vency' . . . is a municipality's inability to pay for all the costs of providing services at the level
and quality required for the health, safety, and welfare of the community . . . "); In re City
of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 263 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) ("The evidence established that there
are many, many services in the City which do not function properly as a result of the City's
financial state . . . . [T]he City was in a state of 'service delivery insolvency' as of July is,
2013, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future.").
312. That said, courts have not been clear about what "service delivery insolvency" means. It may
mean that reducing services below a certain level will lead to future revenue losses, as it will
drive exit, or it might mean that there is some kind of right to a certain level of city services.
For an excellent discussion of this debate and problem, see Michelle Wilde Anderson, The
New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1130-51 (2014).
313. For a similar proposal concerning commercial bankruptcy, see Zachary Liscow, Counter-
Cyclical Bankruptcy Law: An Efficiency Argument for Employment-Preserving Bankruptcy Rules,
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vations that make access to Chapter 9 easier for municipalities or push gov-
ernmental reform would help alleviate the distorting effect local debt crises
have on migration patterns. Judges should consider the effects of such deci-
sions on the broader economy, and ask for advice from macroeconomic policy-
makers.
More broadly, the question facing a bankruptcy court in the case of a de-
clining city is very different from one facing unexpected one-time debt. A place
like Atlantic City does not need the equivalent of corporate reorganization. It
needs liquidation, both of its physical assets and its governmental structure.
Without a monopoly on gambling or substantial numbers of beachgoers, At-
lantic City should be much, much smaller. The question is how to get it there.
Bankruptcy courts have started to notice the newfound nature of the prob-
lem they face with regard to declining municipalities. For instance, the Detroit
plan included $1.7 billion for revitalization, including money for reducing the
size of the housing stock through demolition.3 14 That is, the court allowed the
city to pay back less debt in order to ensure that the city became a more sensi-
ble size going forward. Whether this is appropriate or necessary should be in-
formed by its effect on macroeconomic conditions, not just city-level factors.
CONCLUSION: A TOOLKIT FOR REVIVING LABOR MOBILITY
The primary goal of this Article has been to identify a problem of national
import: sluggish interstate mobility, particularly away from poor metropolitan
areas and toward rich ones, harms the broader economy. While it does not at-
tempt to provide comprehensive answers, this Conclusion seeks to provide a
framework for thinking through future solutions.
A too-easy answer is that states and localities should simply fix the problem
by changing their policies. These governments created the problem, the argu-
ment goes, so they should fix it. But it is not so easy. As Adrian Vermeule and
Eric Posner have noted, articles like this one that point to structural problems
in public decisionmaking should not suggest solutions that ignore the very
structural problem they diagnose.1
116 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2016), which argues that commercial bankruptcy decisions
should turn on the state of unemployment within the broader economy.
314. Steven Church, Detroit Bankruptcy Plan Approval Opens Way for Revival, BLOOMBERG (NOV. 7,
2014, 1:04 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2o14-11-o7/detroit-bankruptcy
-judge-approves-7-billion-debt-plan [http://perma.cc/F7S4-Z2R5] (discussing Detroit's
approval of a $1.7 billion revitalization plan).
315. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REv. 1743
(2013).
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In this Article, I have argued that state and local governments harm nation-
al labor markets and macroeconomic policymaking largely due to countervail-
ing state and local interests. To simply tell states and localities to solve the
problems discussed would ignore the analysis above. That said, a reform-
minded state or local politician, elected by chance, might establish procedural
changes that would alter the policies that local politics produce. In other work,
for example, I have discussed how such a politician might propose procedural
changes in land use that would create a stable political equilibrium resulting in
equally democratic but less restrictive policies than we see today.316 For in-
stance, a city might require the local legislature to set a "zoning budget" every
two years, or a goal for housing construction, that would bind itself from ap-
proving down-zonings until that goal is met (and require one-for-one up- and
down-zoning tradeoffs after the target is hit). Doing so would solve collective
action problems inside the legislature, much as fiscal budgeting is designed to
limit sequential pork-laden appropriations bills. Further, the mayor-a
citywide official concerned with citywide needs, not local neighborhood ones -
could be given the power to propose a budget, and presumably would do so at
the maximum level acceptable to the city council. Changing the order of voting
on issues, and the decisionmakers who get to set the agenda, can influence the
result.
Still, the central problem is that state and local policymakers do not have
incentives to protect the broader national labor market. Only federal policy-
makers can be expected to act on behalf of such an interest. As a result, while
state and local policies are primary contributors to the mobility problem, the
focus of reform must be at the federal level.
Rather than lay out a full program to address the multitude of individual
policy questions raised in this Article, it seems more useful to discuss how a re-
form-minded national politician should think about the problem of stagnant
internal labor markets. The logic of the Article suggests that she should ask
herself a few questions:
First, have the costs of local control become too high? There are plenty of
very good reasons to allow states and localities to regulate land use, occupa-
tional licensing, property law, public benefits, and so forth. Even if local control
makes the labor market more sclerotic, these might remain sensible institution-
al-design decisions for which the benefits outweigh the costs.
However, it may also be the case that state and local control no longer make
sense, even if they once did. Changes in the economy and the political land-
scape might have diminished the benefits of local control such that the costs
316. Schleicher, supra note II, at 1722-23.
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outweigh them. With respect to occupational licensing, for example, the na-
tionalization of medical or legal markets might make state control less attrac-
tive. A national bar exam or national rules on the scope of practice for doctors
and nurse practitioners may make sense. More generally, changes in the econ-
omy may have made it such that the costs of local control have become too se-
vere. If so, the federal government should preempt state or local regulations
and establish its own.
Second, is reform that encourages interstate mobility possible without dis-
placing the useful aspects of local control? For instance, the Obama Admin-
istration proposed creating interstate compacts for harmonized occupational
licensing rules across states.'17 It also proposed best practices for limiting the
negative effect of such rules. Perhaps the Commerce Department could issue a
new model Standard State Zoning Enabling Act that includes limits on local
capacity to exclude."' The federal government could also broker deals between
states that allow public workers to move without losing access to their pension
benefits. Such federal policies could target national-level pathologies while still
largely leaving regulatory authority in the hands of state and local govern-
ments.
More coercive efforts might also make sense. Aaron Edlin and Rebecca Haw
Allensworth suggest hat the federal government could go after occupational
licensing by limiting the state-action immunity doctrine in antitrust.' Simi-
larly, Fair Housing Act enforcement and strong enforcement of the recent
Affirmative Furthering Fair Housing regulations could limit certain exclusion-
ary zoning practices when they disproportionately harm racial minorities.320
The federal government could also create tax incentives for states and local-
ities that decrease entry limits. On the one hand, it could hand out carrots for
good behavior. For instance, Josh Barro has suggested a Race-to-the-Top-style
program for localities that increase housing construction.32 1 And if the carrot
fails, policymakers could try a stick. Noting that homeowners tend to push for
317. White House Licensing Report, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING, supra note 167, at 43.
318. This is Bob Ellickson's idea. The original Standard State Zoning Enabling Act was perhaps
the most influential and important model state law ever created. See Hills & Schlei-
cher, supra note 149, at 97-98 (discussing the history of the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act).
319. Edlin & Haw, supra note 19, at 1094.
320. Furman, supra note 158, at 11-12 (explaining how Fair Housing Act enforcement and new
regulations can lead to greater housing density).
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restrictive housing policies and also tend to reap the benefits, Edward Glaeser
and Joseph Gyourko propose that the federal government suspend the mort-
gage-interest deduction for localities that fail to allow sufficient housing con-
struction.32 2 The federal tax deduction for state and local taxes could be modi-
fied to not apply to any property-tax payer with property assessed at lower than
some percentage of the property's real value.
These proposals do not force the federal government to become directly in-
volved in areas of local policymaking. Instead, they vindicate the federal inter-
est by offering financial benefits or imposing costs - then leaving the states and
localities to figure out how to comply.
Third, can the federal government bypass some of these problems, and the
prodigious political difficulties facing reform in these areas, and address the
problem of interstate mobility in a second-best manner? As one example, the
federal government could simply provide incentives to relocate. During the
1960s and 1970s, the federal government did just this, although the incentives
were narrowly targeted, and it proved difficult to measure the success of the
program.323 Congress has also provided trade adjustment assistance to workers
who move long distances after losing their jobs because of trade deals or import
competition.32
These mobility incentive programs largely have been targeted at specific
problems, such as layoffs following new international trade agreements. But it
is not hard to imagine more general policies. For instance, Congress could in-
crease the Earned Income Tax Credit for otherwise-qualifying taxpayers who
322. EDWARD GLAESER & JOSEPH GYOURKO, RETHINKING FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY: How To
MAKE HOUSING PLENTIFUL AND AFFORDABLE 143 (2008).
323. Charles F. Mueller, Migration of the Unemployed: A Relocation Assistance Program, 104
MONTHLY LAB. REv. 62 (1981) (assessing the success of the Department of Labor's Job
Search and Relocation Assistance program). Also, under the Manpower Development and
Training Act of 1962, the Department of Labor funded several projects to subsidize labor
mobility. See James Nelson & Luther Tweeten, Subsidized Labor Mobility-An Alternative Use
of Development Funds, 7 ANNALS REGIONAL SCl. 57, 58 (1973). The research about these pro-
jects states that they were successful at improving labor outcomes for recipients. Id. at 62-65.
But it also notes that it is difficult to assign causality or do rigorous cost-benefit analysis be-
cause they did not randomize the program or use other social-scientific methods to test cau-
sality. Id. at 65-66.
324. Trade Act of 1974 § 222, 19 U.S.C. § 2272 (2012); see also EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN., DEP'T OF
LABOR, TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR WORKERS PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 4, 52
(2015) (noting that the Act offers assistance to "workers whose employment has been ad-
versely affected by foreign trade" the Act includes relocation assistance for "workers who
have to accept a job outside of their commuting area and relocate" covering "90% of allowa-
ble relocation costs, plus an additional lump sum payment of up to $1,250, available if state
elects to provide the benefit").
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relocate to a new state (or move a certain number of miles). Such a program
could create an incentive to move that might overcome the drawbacks that fed-
eral, state, and local laws create. Alternatively, the federal government could
create relocation-subsidy programs that specifically target economically de-
pressed areas. The United States could follow Canada's lead: The provincial
government of Newfoundland and Labrador has begun a program that offers
relocation subsidies to residents of depressed coastal villages.32 5
Another possibility is subsidizing information about mobility.32 6 College
graduates are more mobile than people who didn't go to college, and while
much of this effect is due to increased economic opportunity, it is at least possi-
ble that some of this is due to the psychological and informational benefits go-
ing to college has on learning about other places. Other historical policies - like
mass conscription in the Army-created similar opportunities for learning
about other places.327 Perhaps subsidies for higher education could be under-
stood as encouraging people to move. Other programs, like Teach for America,
serve to provide small groups of people with information about working in
other areas of the country.
Fourth, are reforms possible in the areas the federal government already
regulates? Congress could order entities that are tasked with macroeconomic
policymaking - the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department - to conduct
studies about the effect of policies on labor mobility. All policymakers, from
regulators at he Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to enforcers of
the Fair Housing Act could use this information to better determine the macro-
economic effects of their policies. Congress and courts could reform the Chap-
ter 9 process, as discussed above.
Whether or not it adopts these particular policy proposals, it is imperative
that the federal government take action to combat stagnation in our labor mar-
ket. Many of the problems described here -zoning, occupational licensing, fis-
cal crises in declining cities - are getting worse over time. As these problems
fester, labor mobility will continue to decline, monetary policy will be less
325. Josh Wingrove, Why Canadians Are Being Offered Cash To Abandon Their Homes, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 21, 2016, 5:oo AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2o16-o9-21/why
-canadians-are-being-offered-cash-to-abandon-their-homes [http://perma.cc/E7SD
-RVLJ].
326. Thanks to Ian Ayres for suggesting this point.
327. Cf Chulhee Lee, Military Service and Economic Mobility: Evidence from the American Civil
War, 49 EXPLORATIONs ECON. HIST. 367, 368 (2012) (showing that Civil War veterans were
more likely to move than those who did not serve, driven by "their experience of traveling
away from their hometowns").
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effective, growth will be slower, and the tax burden of funding the safety net
will be higher.
These economic costs come along with perhaps more severe political ones.
The 2016 presidential election has been interpreted by some as the revenge of
residents of rural and exurban areas left out of the economic boom we have
seen in richer metropolitan areas.32 8 To the extent that this interpretation of the
2016 election is correct,329 a policy agenda aimed at increasing mobility is a tool
for addressing the concerns of those rural and exurban voters. Further, such an
agenda would capture the spirit of this Article's argument that residents of rich
urbanized areas are excluding residents of poorer exurban ones from oppor-
tunity. Politicians should consider pushing for reforms that will break down
geographic barriers to opportunity. Doing so will not only make the country
richer, but will further the political ideal of forging a unified economy and peo-
ple from our many regions and groups.
328. See, e.g., Emily Badger, Quoctrung Bui & Adam Pearce, The Election Highlighted a Growing
Rural-Urban Split, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2ol6/11/12
/upshot/this-election-highlighted-a-growing-rural-urban-split.html [http://perma.cc
/U8SJ-M96J]; Helena Bottemiller Evich, Revenge of the Rural Voter, POLITICO (Nov. 13,
2016, 7:o8 AM), http://WWW.politico.com/story/2o16/11/hillary-clinton-rural-voters
-trump-231266 [http://perma.cc/5B8V-Q7EN].
329. But see Jamelle Bouie, White Won, SLATE (Nov. 9, 2016, 3:30 AM), http://www.slate.com
/articles/news-and politics/politics/2o16/11/white won.html [http://perma.cc/UV5C
-LX6B]; Ezra Klein, The Hard Question Isn't Why Clinton Lost-It's Why Trump Won, Vox
(Nov. 11, 2016, 12:00 PM), http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2o16/11/11/13578618
/why-did-trump-win [http://perma.cc/R776-CNU9].
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